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ABSTRACT
In a world where the most of the people has at least one computer connected to the 
Internet for access to the huge variety of online services offered nowadays, it is really 
important  the  security  of  this  services.  Services  in  which  the  people  trust  giving 
personal  and  confidential  information  such  as  bank  account  to  buy  by  Internet, 
credentials  to  access  to  the  online-bank,  can  not  be  vulnerable  to  attacks  from 
“hackers” looking for this valuable information. But this task of protect these services 
ensuring that the private information of the users is not going to be filtered, is not an 
easy task, because, due to the importance of this relevant information, sophisticated 
and  powerful  attacks  has  greatly  increased.  By  this,  the  security  of  business  IT 
systems has never been so important. 
Having the correct information at the right time can make the difference between 
success and failure in this task to secure the online services protecting the private 
information from unauthorized disclosure and from malicious changes and deletions. 
In this aspect of the computer security is focused this thesis, where tools wich purpose 
is to capture and study new attacks (honeypots) and tools to detect in real time attacks 
suffered against the systems (IDS) are explained.
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Nowadays it is impossible to imagine a world without all the information needed at the 
distance  of  one  click.  This  dependence  to  the  Internet  convert  all  the  computer  that  are 
connected to it in a target for continuous attacks. But this is not new, since the beginning of 
the  cyberspace  have  been people  finding  some vulnerability  in  the  computer  in  order  to 
exploit  them  to  get  some  benefit.  The  techniques  used  by  these  people,  now  knowing 
incorrectly as “hackers”, have evolved together with the expansion of the Internet.
At  the  beginning,  the  efforts  of  the  attackers  were  focused  on  servers  with  some 
vulnerable  services  running,  but  actually  the  security  of  these  machines  has  increase 
considerably doing really difficult execute successfully some attack against them with only 
one computer. By this reason, with the time the effort of attackers have been focused in the 
client computers in order to get botnets from where carry out another plans of attack. 
Internet  is  plenty  of  malicious  traffic  like  virus,  worms,  constantly  targeting  random 
computer  with  the  purpose  to  get  the  control  of  these  machines.  The  major  part  of  this 
vulnerable machines belong to particular clients: a computer recently re-installed connected to 
the Internet without the correspondent updates, a router with incorrect configuration, firewalls 
with  fails  in  the  iptables.  Although  this  problems  damage  directly  to  the  networks 
administrator who can suffer some attack from this zombies machines, for the administartors 
is  very hard do something to prevent thes problems, this  concern to the formation of the 
particular clients. 
Focusing in the administrator side, what can do and administrator to try to prevent, detect,  
and act against the attacks that the machines could suffer? Throughout the thesis this question 
is  answered by means  of  the  explanation  of  some applications  which  help  to  detect  and 
prevent  attempts  of  intrusion  on  the  system  (Intrusion  Detection  Systems,  Intrusion 
Prevention System1), and application which purpose is focus the attention of the attackers to 
get more time to counteract and analyze the attacks (honeypots).
The topic of this thesis is focused in the study of some of these applications trying to 
analyze how reliable  are  and trying to  show that  the use of  this  help is  part  but  not  the 
complete measures that a network administrator must to carry out in his system. All these 
things has been treated emphasizing on the importance of the user education, because, like the 
hacker Mitnick one time said:
“Technology is critical but we have to look at people and processes. Social engineering  
is a form of hacking that uses influence tactics”.[1]
 1.1 Thesis purpose
The  thesis  purpose  is  to  give  a  review of  some measures  that  can  help  the  network 
administrators in the labor of maintain the network the most secure possible, trying to detect 
when the system is in rick to suffer an attack and, if this occur, detect it as soon as possible.
Protection tools like IDS and honeypots are going to be analyzed in order to let know to 
the readers the benefits and inconvenient of them.
The practical part will show how to install,  configure and how these protections tools 
work and which kind of results show. To show this result, some attacks will be carried out  




using the Penetration Testing and Security Auditing Linux Distribution Backtrack.
Finally, in the conclusion is exposed an analysis about the functionality of the IDS and 
honeypots in the task of improve the security of the system.
 1.2 Outline of thesis
Chapter 2: Computer Security:.This part is an introduction into the computer security 
world with a point focus briefly on the server side security.
Chapter 3: Intrusion Detection System: This part explain what is an intrusion and how 
to detect them with use IDSs. An explanation and classification of the IDS is explained 
too.
Chapter 4: Honeypot: This part explain and classify the different kinds of honeypots and 
it use to detect and understand attacks.
Chapter 5: Penetration testing: This part explain briefly the purpose of the penetration 
testing and list some of the application used in a test of intrusion.
Chapter 6: Experimental part: This part explain the installation and configuration of 
two important security tools like are Snort and Nessus. Furthermore, some attacks has 
been performed in a virtual environment to show how Snort reacts.
Chapter 7: Limitations: This part show the limitations to do this thesis.
Chapter 8: Future work: This part show a possible way to continue the work started in 
this thesis.
Chapter 9: Conclusions and suggestion: This section concludes the thesis and contain 




 2 Computer Security
Nowadays  computer  and network  technologies  are  present  in  whatever  aspects  of  the 
human live doing the daily work easier. This dependence to computer and network system has 
introduced new risks in the daily work, “cyber security risks”. In order to do more secure this 
coexistence emerged the concept of Computer Security:
“The protection afforded to an automated information system in order to attain the  
applicable  objectives  of  preserving  the  integrity,  availability,  and  confidentiality  of  
information  system  resources  (includes  hardware,  software,  firmware,  
information/data, and telecommunication)”.[2]
This definition introduce the three most important objectives of the computer security: 
maintain the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (C.I.A.) in the computer and network 
system which may be compromised by cyber attacks(Figure 1).
• Confidentiality: Ensure the access to data only to authorized users using methods like 
login with username and password.
• Integrity: Related with the credibility of the information resources. It ensure that data 
has not been modify inappropriately and that the data come from the person that is 
said. Auditing the system can insure the integrity of the information.
• Availability: The information system is available when someone needs it. This can be 
carried out with data backups, redundant systems, etc.
The main objective of an intrusion is compromise some of this aspect in a system breaking 
it security causing that the system enter in an insecure state. Typically this kind of actions 
leave traces detectable by an IDS. This intrusions are divided in two basics kinds[3]:
• Inbound: Originated from outside of the internal network (attacks with the purpose of 
penetrate the perimeter defenses of the network) like worms, virus, hacking, DDoS, 
spyware, back doors.
• Outbound: Originated intentional or unintentional from within the internal network 
(e.g. employ device that propagate a worm or virus, user who respond to a phishing, 
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This classification is really important for the IDS in order to quantify the normal behavior 
of a user in the system. A good study of the behavior of the users and the activity in the 
network can do an IDS a good application to improve and audit the security of a network. 
Figure 2, take from the “2007 CSI Survey”[4], shows the IDS placed in the top 5 tools used in 
information security. Anti-virus and Firewall are consolidated in the first positions.
One way to try to reduce the impact of an intrusion in the system is divide it in different  
logical zones. The objective of this division is to do harder for an attacker to access to the hole 
system giving access only to a part of it when a vulnerability has been exploited. This means 
that when an attacker get access to a specific resource in the system, this attacker has to 
exploit another security measure to get access to another part of the system.
Figure 3 show a typical topology of a network divided by zones in order to increase the 
security of it. This zones are explained after Figure 3.
4
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• Network  Perimeter:  It  is  know  as  DMZ (Demilitarized  Zone)  too.  It  is  the  most 
external zone of the network.
If  the internal  network it  is  considered the “trusted” network and the external  the 
“untrusted” network, the DMZ could be considered as a “semi-trusted” area. It is not 
as secure as the internal network but it is more secure than the Internet because it is 
place behind a firewall. So it is the zone situated between the Internet and the internal 
network of a company. 
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The best practice is to use two firewall to build this zone, a front end and a back end  
firewall. The front end firewall has a direct interface connected to the Internet. It is a 
first filter for the traffic from the outside to the private network, this firewall will filter 
the  traffic  less  accurately  than  the  front  back  firewall,  which  will  provide  more 
protection for the internal network with less negative impact in the performance for 
the public servers.
The  most  common use  for  this  zone  is  place  the  public  server  from the  internal 
network, like mail and web serves but, furthermore, it could be use for a special use 
that is to place a “honeypot”. For this special use, typically the DMZ is divided in two 
parts: the external DMZ, where the honeypot is placed, and the internal DMZ, where 
the servers are placed. A honeypot it is composed by one or more computer to lure 
attacks, tracking and detecting attacks destined to the network.
So a perimeter network allows external users access to a specific servers and provide 
to the networks administrators more granular access to the resources of the network, 
more security and reduce the traffic to the internal part.[5]
• Server Security. This important part of the network will be the main topic of the thesis, 
doing an study of how to detect possible attacks or intruder in the system.
A server is  a host  designed to  provide services  to other  clients.  By this  it  is  very 
important the security of the servers, because when one server is vulnerable, important 
information could be steal, modify, etc. and the services offered to the clients could 
fail or not to be the proper.
The most important part to defense is the entry to the server, because, when all the 
other measures has been compromised, it is the last line of defense. To protect this, it 
is necessary the use of firewalls, internal VPNs, IDS, IPS, etc.
• Protection of clients and end points. Another important point in the network are the 
end  points  (the  users  stations).  Such  important  as  secure  the  direct  access  to  the 
network is to secure indirect access. Millions of threat like virus, worms are waiting to 
get the control of a machine. The users can introduced this threat in the machines 
consciously  or  unconsciously.  When  this  happen,  an  external  attacker  could  have 
direct access to the internal network compromising important information. By this, it 
is really important to take care of this part of the network.
Some measure  to  protect  this  part  of  the  network  consist  in  the  use  of  antivirus, 
antispam HIPS, web filtering.
• Secure  remote  access.  Nowadays,  where  the  companies  can  have  more  than  one 
campus  with  centralized  information,  where  the  companies  have  business  in  the 
foreign, where it is possible to work from home is really important to be able to get 
remote access to the infrastructure of a company.
This remote access allow people to connect to a computer network from any location 
using  an  external  computer  connected  to  the  Internet.  It  purpose  is  to  grant  the 
possibility to use the organizations system and to access to the necessary information 
from anywhere and at any moment.
The benefits of this kind of access have not limits. The companies can become more 
flexible and improve the way of work. But all the benefits that it can provides could be 
converted in disadvantages and could be a big risk if the proper security measures has 




the system is available for the attackers.
It  is  important  to  pay  attention  to  the  wireless  access  too.  With  the  wireless 
connections the restrictions of mobility by the office than a wired connection supposed 
have disappeared but one wireless access point without the proper configuration is the 
easiest way for an external person to enter in the system, so it is really important to 
take care about this aspect, and do not to think that because it is placed inside of the 
company the administrator has to paid less attention to it.
• Prevention of physical threats. As important as the points explained previously is the 
physical access. If the best security measures have been implemented but the physical 
access to the servers do not exist or it is very poor, a company will be protected by 
external threat but it security could be compromised from inside. To prevent that this 
happen, measures like security access card, biometric devices, must be implemented 
too.
 2.1 Computer security threats
Since the beginning, the computer science has evolved quickly and without break, doing 
the work of millions of person easier. At the beginning, few people had a computer but with 
not much years, this has changed to the point that it is impossible to imagine a company or a 
home  without  computers.  Unfortunately,  with  the  advance  of  this  technology,  malicious 
people have seen the possibility to benefit of this advance in detriment of the common users. 
This fact has been reflected in the evolution of the computer threats like viruses and worms.
The main purpose of the most of the first viruses and worms were to spread as much as 
possible getting fame by the high level of infection. Only very few viruses and worms were 
designed to cause damage to files and computers. This malicious software or “malware” was 
the beginning of the “cyber vandalism”.
But  today,  with  computers  everywhere,  the  most  of  viruses,  worms,  trojans  or  other 
malicious programs are designed with the purpose to get money illegally. This fact has been 
happening more and more frequently by the fact that the number of computer users has been 
increasing and each time these users are taking less care of the information stored in the 
computers that are using.[6]
The design of all this malware, starts with the research of some vulnerability find in an 
operation system, in a software, etc. Unfortunately these vulnerabilities are quite frequent in 
the computers system doing them vulnerable to many threats which can inflict different kinds 
of damage. All this threats will affect the confidentiality or the integrity of the data or the 
availability of a system. Figure 4 show the level of risk of a vulnerability since it has been 
discovered until the patch for this vulnerability is installed in the computer.
To control the risks that can suffer a system, administrators and users need to know the 
vulnerabilities of the system and the treats that may exploit with them. In function of a risk 





Furthermore the malware, there are another kinds of threats like:
• Discontent  employees:  Discontent  employees  or  exemployees  could  from modify, 
steal,  sell  critical  and  secret  company  information  to  leave  back  doors,  set  logic 
bombs, destroy data, etc.
• Denial or interruption of service: Attacks like these could delay the system or leave it 
out of service.
• Environmental: Environmental issues such as fire, flood, power fails, and so on caused 
naturally or by an attacker could provoke failures or damage in the systems.
• Broadcast sniffing: If an attacker run a packet analyzer in a switch, it could be possible 
to get sensible information about the topology and architecture of the network.
• Default configuration: Leave the default configuration in the devices of the network is 
a very silly mistake that sometimes occur maybe because the network administrators 
are overload of work or by a simple fault of attention.
The rest of this point will describe briefly some of the most common malware.
 2.1.1 Viruses
According to the definition in the book Hacking Exposed 6[8], viruses are:
“Infectious  programs  that  can  reproduce  themselves  but  require  interaction  to  
propagate”
The first computer virus dates from 1980s, the term is attributed to Fred Cohen in 1983.[9] 
Together with worms, viruses is one of the most popular forms of malware in circulation 
nowadays. 
A computer virus is attached to another executable program and it is executed secretly 
when the infected executable is run. Once a virus is executed, it can do whatever thing, such 
as erase files, another programs and so on. It is spread from computer to computer by sharing 
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Figure 4: Vulnerability risk level in function of the time
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disks or sending the infected programs by the network.
The most of the viruses have three parts[9][10]:
• Infection mechanism: It is the first part of the structure of a virus. It is the code that  
allow the viruses to be replicated itself.
• Trigger:  It  is  the  second  major  part  of  a  virus.  It  is  the  event  or  condition  that 
determines  when  the  payload  is  activated  or  delivered  based  on  a  mathematical 
formula with criteria such as date, number of files infected.
• Payload: Usually, when a virus has a trigger, it will have a payload. Besides spreading, 
the payload is what the virus does, from a simple message to reformatting the hard 
disk.
 2.1.2 Worms
According to the definition in the book Hacking Exposed 6[8], worms are:
“Infectious programs that can self-propagate via a network”.
Unlike viruses, worms are independent program and once have been activated, themselves 
are replicated and propagated again. Worms are propagated via of mails or exploiting some 
vulnerability of other computer connected to the same computer network.
In addition to propagation and replication, the worm usually performs some unwanted 
function  such  as  degradation  of  the  system  performance  and  security,  steal  sensitive 
information, install other dangerous programs like backdoors or Trojans.
 2.1.3 Rootkits and backdoors
According to the definition in the book Hacking Exposed 6[8], are:
“Programs  designed  to  infiltrate  a  system,  hide  their  own  presence,  and  provide  
administrative  control  and  monitoring  functionality  to  an  unauthorized  user  or  
attacker”.
Backdoors, also known as rootkits, are programs which allow an attacker to connect back 
to it with administrator (or root) access. A rootkit can make many changes to a system to hide 
its existence. One of the most common technique to be undetectable by anti-virus, is to be 
installed in the Master Boot Record (MBR). The MBR is read by the computer when the 
systems is power on, before than the operation system is loaded getting more control than an 
anti-virus, which will be load latter. One method to be installed is via a Trojan horse, another 
method is by hacker activity.
 2.1.4 Bots and zombies
According to the definition in the book Hacking Exposed 6[8], bots and zombies are:
“Very similar to rootkits and backdoors but focused additionally on usurping the victim  
system’s resources to perform a specific task or tasks (for example, distributed denial of  
service against an unrelated target or send spam)”.
The word bot is an abbreviation of the word Robot[11], when a computer is infected by 




A bot is a program which purpose is to launch attacks against another machines. Typically 
the first objective of the bots is to be installed in hundreds or thousands of computers. When 
enough computers have been affected by the bot, from them is launched a simultaneous attack 
against some objectives with different purposes. Some of these purposes are:
• Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks (DDoS).
• Spamming.
• Sniffing traffic.
• Spreading new malware.
• Attacking IRC chat networks.
 2.1.5 Trojan horses
As is defined in the book Hacking Exposed 6[8], trojan horses are:
“Software that does something other than, or in addition to, its purported functionality.  
Usually, this means installing a rootkit or back door”.[8]
Trojan horses are programs which purpose is to install hacking software on a system in 
order to grant access to a hacker to that system, for example, installing a backdoor.
The  way  to  spread  this  malware  is  by  means  of  files  attached  in  mails,  physical 
installation, IRC chat, infected websites, etc. When a user sing on in a computer and goes 
online, the Trojan is activated doing its purpose. Usually, the purpose of a trojan horse is give 
access to the hacker  into the system (RATs) but,  furthermore,  trojan horse can be purely 
destructive or denying programs, install an FTP, keyloggers or password sending, etc.
 2.2 Background on server-side security
A server is a host which main function is to provide one or more services to other hosts 
(clients) through a connection established over a network from the clients to the server. There 
are a lot of kinds of servers with different purpose. Some examples are, database server which 
provides database services for another host or applications like web serves, web applications. 
The web serves provide web content services. Another example is a file server that provides a 
location for shared disk access. It  is possible to find much more types of servers such as 
authentication, application, email,  DNS, print servers. It is common that a server provides 
some of this services simultaneously.
Hackers  are  constantly attacking  the  servers   with  the  objective  to  steal  the valuable 
information stored on them or to stop some important service that these are offering. These 
attacks can be externals, such as an attacker situated outside from the company attacked, or 
locals, such as a discontent employee. To be able to mitigate this attacks and secure properly a 
server, first of all, it is needed to know which threats must be mitigated from a server. These 
threats can be originated from many reason, since a bug in the operating system installed on 
the server or some server application, to errors in the end users or administrators, all of them 
have in common than generate a vulnerability in the system.
The efforts  dedicated  to  enhance  the security of  a  server  must  be proportional  to  the 
importance  of  the  information  stored  in  that  system.  For  example,  it  is  more  important 
enhance the security of a server that has personal information about companies, employee, 




system do not need to be protected because a weak system is the origin of a weak network,  
like a link in a chain. All the system need a level of security which depend of the relevance of 
the information stored on it. FIPS PUB 199[12] defines 3 levels of security (low, moderate, 
and high) based on the impact caused on a system by the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or  
availability.
• “The potential impact is LOW if the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability  
could  be  expected  to  have  a  limited  adverse  effect  on  organizational  operations,  
organizational assets, or individuals. A limited adverse effect means that, for example,  
the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability might: (i) cause a degradation in  
mission capability to an extent and duration that the organization is able to perform  
its primary functions, but the effectiveness of the functions is noticeably reduced; (ii)  
result in minor damage to organizational assets; (iii) result in minor financial loss; or  
(iv) result in minor harm to individuals. 
• The  potential  impact  is  MODERATE  if  the  loss  of  confidentiality,  integrity,  or  
availability  could  be  expected  to  have  a  serious  adverse  effect  on  organizational  
operations, organizational assets, or individuals. A serious adverse effect means that,  
for example,  the loss of confidentiality,  integrity, or availability might: (i) cause a  
significant  degradation  in  mission  capability  to  an  extent  and  duration  that  the  
organization  is  able  to  perform its  primary  functions,  but  the  effectiveness  of  the  
functions is significantly reduced; (ii) result in significant damage to organizational  
assets; (iii) result in significant financial loss; or (iv) result in significant harm to  
individuals that does not involve loss of life or serious life threatening injuries. 
• The potential impact is HIGH if the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability  
could be expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect on organizational  
operations,  organizational  assets,  or  individuals.  AMPLIFICATION:  A  severe  or  
catastrophic  adverse  effect  means  that,  for  example,  the  loss  of  confidentiality,  
integrity, or availability might: (i) cause a severe degradation in or loss of mission  
capability to an extent and duration that the organization is not able to perform one  
or more of its primary functions; (ii) result in major damage to organizational assets;  
(iii) result in major financial loss; or (iv) result in severe or catastrophic harm to  
individuals involving loss of life or serious life threatening injuries. ”
To get a server the most secure possible, an administrator must focus its efforts basically 
in  two  actions.  The  first  one  is  to  solve  security  weaknesses,  like  know  vulnerabilities, 
installing the needed parches. The second action is restrict the functionality of the system, 
offering only the services needed.  NIST has provided some basic  server  security steps to 
ensure the security of a server which are listed below[13]:
• Plan the installation of the operation system (OS) and other components needed for the 
server before it deployment.
• Install, configure, and secure the OS.
• Install, configure, and secure the server software.
• Ensure that the content of the server is properly secured.
• Deploy  appropriate  network  protection  mechanisms  in  function  of  the  particular 
situations of the server, such as location of the server's clients, location of the server in 
the network, types of services offered. The description and deploy of some of this 




• Once  the  system  with  all  it  functionalities  is  deploy,  it  is  necessary  than  an 





 3 Intrusion Detection System
RFC 2828[31] defined:
“Security Intrusion: A security event, or a combination of multiple security events,  
that constitutes a security incident in which an intruder gains,  or attempts to gain,  
access to a system (or system resource) without having authorization to do so.
Intrusion detection: A security service that monitors and analyzes system events for  
the purpose of finding, and providing real-time or near real-time warning of, attempts  
to access system resources in an unauthorized manner”.[31]
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is software that automates the intrusion detection 
process.
 3.1 History
Since the beginning of the computer science, intrusion detection techniques have been 
used by the administrators. With the time, these techniques have evolved.
At the beginning, systems administrators were sitting in front of a console monitoring the 
user activities trying to detect some intrusion like users logged locally in holidays. 
The next step was in the late '70s and early '80s. In this period, system administrators 
typically printed audit logs on fan-folded paper generating huge stack of paper. Obviously, 
search manually between all that papers was very time consuming, by this, the administrators 
mainly used that audit logs as a forensic tool to try to find the cause of a particular security 
incident. With the time, the storage became cheaper and the audit logs were moved. With the 
audit logs stored in computers, appeared programs to analyze the data. However, analysis was 
slow and computationally intense by this reason the analysis take place when the system's 
user load was low. Therefore, the intrusions detected were after occurred.
By that time, on 26th February 1980, James P. Anderson wrote “Computer Security Threat: 
Monitoring and Surveillance”, the first paper about IDSs. In this paper, Anderson wrote about 
the importance of analyze the audit  trail  and how to do it.  Anderson was focused on the 
collection of  logs  that  showed abnormal  use of  the  system, such as  use  outside  of  time,  
abnormal frequency of use, abnormal behavior of the users.
Anderson explained that:
• Security logs must be obtained from different resources of the system.
• The detections of unusual behavior of users is necessary to avoid internal attacks.
• Security administrators, in order to find the problem, must get enough data.
• The security audit trail should be able to recognize the attacker strategy.
At the beginning of the '90s, appeared the firsts real-time intrusion detection systems. This 
allowed the detection of attacks and attempts of attacks instantaneously giving the opportunity 
to the system administrators to take some measure. At the beginning of this decade appeared 
one of the first  IDS for network traffic,  the Network System Monitor (NSM).[32] It  was 
developed in the California University and it worked on an UNIX station of Sun. NSM had a 
similar process to work than IDS of today:




• Network packets were obtained.
• The protocol was identified.
• Data was inspected and compared with statistics and rules.
 3.2 Intruders
Together with the viruses, the intruder is one of the most publicized threats to security, 
generally referred as a hacker or cracker. An important study of intrusion[33] identified three 
classes of intruders. The following list shows the different kind of intrudes. This list is shorted 
from less to more on a scale of difficult to detect the activity carried by the intruder:
• The  Masquerader:  Could  be  either  an  external  penetrator  who  has  penetrated 
physically in the installation of the company,  or an employee with or without full 
access  to  a  computer  who  has  obtained  the  username  and  password  of  another 
legitimate user. In this case it is really difficult to distinguish the legitimate user from 
the masquerader who have the proper username and password. The next audit trail 
could help the administrator to identify this kind of intruders:
◦ Use of the legitimate user credentials outside of normal time.
◦ Abnormal frequency of use of the account of the legitimate user.
◦ Abnormal volume of data generated in the account of the legitimate user.
◦ Abnormal patterns of references to programs or data.
To be able to detect this “abnormal” use of an user account, have to be some notions 
of which is a “normal” behavior of the user supplanted.
• The legitimate user (misfeasor): An authorized user who abuses of its privileges to 
access to data, programs, or resources such access is not authorized. Since the user is 
authorized to use the system, in the audit trail records do not appear any abnormal 
patterns of reference, login times, etc. By this reason it is more difficult to detect this 
kind of users that masqueraders users. The trail to search in the logs, in order to detect  
this kind of intruders, is access to certain information which access is not authorized in 
the conduct of it job.
• The clandestine user: This is possibly the most difficult intruder to detect by normal 
audit trail methods. This user is a person who have access to supervisory control of the 
system and uses this control to evade auditing and access controls or to suppress audit 
collection. There is nothing to do to detect this type of user because is able to alter the 
operating  system  to  suppress  audit  recording  unless  that  this  user  activates  his 
clandestine operations in a masquerader or legitimate user or if the operating system is 
continuously being compared with some reference version.
It is clear that to be able to suppress the audit logs in a network, the attacker must  
traverse  a  number  of  security  points  that  with  an  experimented  administrator  is 
virtually impossible.
The intruder attacks can be ranged from the benign to the serious. Benign attacks are 
carried out by people who only want  to  explore Internet  and see what  there are.  Serious 
attacks are carried out by people who are attempting to stole private information, modify this 




• Performing a remote root compromise of an email server .
• Defacing a web server .
• Guessing or cracking passwords. 
• Viewing or copying sensitive data, such as payroll records, medical information, and 
credit card numbers, without authorization .
• Running a packet sniffer on a workstation to capture usernames and passwords. 
• Using a permission error on an anonymous FTP server to distribute pirated software 
and music files .
• Dialing into an unsecured modem and gaining internal network access .
• Posing as an executive, calling the help desk, resetting the executive’s email password, 
and learning the new password .
• Using an unattended, logged-in workstation without permission. 
 3.2.1 Intruder Behavior
With the evolution of the security measures, the techniques and behavior of the intruders 
are constantly changing to evade the new detection systems and exploit new weaknesses that 
have not been solved yet. Despite this changes, intruders typically follow some recognizable 
behavior pattern which differ from those of ordinary users. In the following, some examples 
of intruder behavior patterns are explained.[35]
 3.2.1.1 Hackers
Typically, hackers break into a system for one reason: Status. Between the hackers, this 
status  is  determined by the  level  of  competence.  By this  reason,  the  hackers  attacks  are 
destined to companies indiscriminately, searching it weakness point. When hackers break in a 
company, they share the results obtained with other hackers to prove their success.
Some typical hacker behavior patterns are:
• Select the target using IP lookup tools such as NSLookup, Dig, and others.
• Map network for accessible services using tools such as NMAP.
• Identify potentially vulnerable services.
• Brute force password.
• Install remote administration tool (DameWare).
• Wait for administrator to log on and capture his password.
• Use that password to access remainder of network.
Some counter measures are:
• Restrict remote logons to specific IP addresses and/or use VPN technology.
• Monitor logs daily for anomalous behavior, such as a single user logged on locally and 





Criminals are groups of hackers which have specific targets or classes of targets in mind. 
All the targets of the criminals are selected with the purpose to steal money, a common target 
is  an e-commerce server,  with the purpose  to  get  credit  card information.  Once a  site  is 
penetrated, the attack is quick, getting as much valuable information as possible and exiting.
The typical behavior patterns of criminals are:
• Act quickly and precisely to make their activities harder to detect.
• Exploit perimeter through vulnerable ports, services and buffer overflows.
• Use Trojan horses to leave back doors for reentry.
• Use sniffers to capture passwords.
• Make few or no mistakes.
Counter measures:
• Spend resources protecting that which are most valuable.
• Encrypt credit cards in databases.
• Use a dedicated server.
• Purchase extra security options.
 3.2.1.3 Insider Attacks
Usually,  this  kind  of  attacks  are  discontent  employees  with  revenge  sentiment.  This 
intruders  are  the  most  difficult  to  detect  and  prevent.  Insider  attackers  have  access  and 
knowledge about the structure and content of corporate databases.
Some behavior patterns of these intruders are:
• Create network accounts for themselves and their friends.
• Access accounts and applications that this users wouldn’t normally use for their daily 
jobs.
• Conduct furtive instant messaging chats.
• Perform large downloads and file copying.
• Access the network during off-hours.
Some counter measures are:
• Enforce least privilege, only allowing access to the resources employees need to do 
their job.
• Set logs to see what users access and what commands this users are typing.
• Protect those resources that are most important with strong authentication.
• Upon termination, delete all computer and network access.
• When employees leave the company, make a mirror image of the hard drive that has 
been  using  before  reissuing  it.  That  evidence  might  be  needed  if  the  company 




 3.3 IDS overview
Authentication system, access control, firewalls are some of the security measures which 
main purpose is to prevent than the intruders get access to the system. But this measures 
sometimes are not enough, and it  is when another line of defense is needed. This line of 
defense are  the IDS which important  role  to secured a  network is  motivated by the next 
considerations:
• If an intrusion is detected quickly enough, the intruder can be throw out of the system 
before any damage is done or any data are compromised. Even if the detection is not 
enough quickly to prevent the actions of the intruder, the sooner that the intrusion is 
detected, the less amount of damage in the system will be done.
• An effective IDS can dissuade intruders, acting to prevent intrusions.
• New  intrusion  techniques  detected  by  IDS  are  used  to  increase  the  intrusion 
prevention measures.
IDS works based on the assumption that the behavior of an intruder differs from that of an 
authorized user. But, like shows Figure 5, there is not an exact distinction between an attack 
by an intruder and the use of resources by an authorized user. Figure  5 shows an overlap 
between  both  behavior.  That's  why  there  is  a  risk  of  a  false  positive  (authorized  users 
identified as intruders) or a false negative (intruders not identified as intruders) in the results  
show by the IDS. 
The detection of false positives is not so dangerous as false negatives, because are not 
attacks against the system so the system is not compromised, but it is right that a big amount 
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of false positives can drown out correct IDS alerts. A rule could generates false positives 
alerts each 5 minutes. Reviewing one alert each fives minutes generates a huge quantity of 
data and could be possible than an administrator loose a true alert between that numerous 
quantity of false positives. The art of IDS management is learning how to minimize false 
positives without affect the detection of relevant alerts.
Some of the most important desirables characteristics for IDS are[36]:
• It must run continually with minimal human supervision.
• It  must  be  fault  tolerant.  It  must  be  able  to  recover  from system crashes,  either 
accidental or caused by malicious activity. 
• It must resist subversion. The IDS must be able to monitor itself and detect if it has 
been modified by an attacker.
• It must impose a minimal overhead on the system where it is running.
• It must be able to be configured according to the security policies of the system that is 
being monitored.
• It  must  be  able  to  adapt  to  changes  in  system and user  behavior  over  time  (new 
applications installed, users changing from one activity to another).
• It must be able to scale to monitor a large number of hosts.
• It must provide graceful degradation of service. Is some components of the IDS stop 
working for any reason, the rest of them should be affected as little as possible.
• It  must  allow dynamic  reconfiguration.  The  IDS must  be  able  to  be  reconfigured 
without having to restart it.
 3.4 IDS classification
There are different criteria to classify IDSs. Some of the most common are:
• Analysis type: How the information captured is analyzed.
• Information sources: Where the information is captured.
• Type of response: How react the IDS after an attack has been detected.
• Detection time: When the data is analyzed.
 3.4.1 Analysis type
The analysis type refers to how the information captured is analyzed in order to detect 
attacks. It is possible to difference two types:
• Signature detection: Used by most of the commercial systems.
• Anomalies detection: Looks for unusual patterns of activity.
 3.4.1.1 Signature-Based System
A Signature-based IDS(SBS) is based on pattern matching techniques. It works similar to 
an anti-virus. The IDS has a database of know-attacks signatures which is used to compare the 




This technique, usually has a few false positives, but has the inconvenient that new attacks 
(zero day) or polymorphic attacks, are not detected until a signature for this attacks is created 
and the database of the IDS is updated with it. For that reason, attackers have a window of 
time to gain control of the system or application under attacks without be detected.
The advantages of this IDS is that requires a few work to be set up. The users only have to 
select the signatures needed depending of the application installed on the systems deactivating 
unneeded signatures  to  avoid  possible  false  negatives.  Another  advantage is  that  the IDS 
signature-based can classified the alerts generated, which lend the administrators analyze this 
alerts quickly prioritizing the most important alerts.
 3.4.1.2 Anomaly-Based System
Anomaly-Based System (ABS) were developed to overcome the limitations of the SBS 
which are not able to detect zero-day or polymorphic attacks. ABS works assuming that the 
attacks are different from the normal activity. In order to detect these attacks, a statical model 
which describes the normal behavior of the monitored system/network is built.
ABS  works  by  training  itself,  by  means  of  historical  data  collected  during  normal 
operations,  to recognize acceptable behavior sending an alert  when the monitored activity 
deviates from normal activity.
The main advantage of this kind of IDS is the detection of zero-days and polymorphic 
attacks. But the negative side is that it has a high number of false positives, it installation 
requires  expert  personal  because  several  parameters  need  to  be  configured,  such  as  the 
duration of the training. Another inconvenient are that usually works as a black-box and does 
not classify the alerts that throw.
In despite of the possibility of the ABS to detect unknown attacks, its disadvantages and it 
complex  use  provoke  that  the  IDSs  most  used  today  are  signature-based,  mainly  by  it 
simplicity to be implemented, configured and maintained. However, with the apparition, each 
time more frequent, of new attacks, the interest by the ABS is increasing.
 3.4.2 Information sources
Information source is one of the first issues to define when the structure of the IDS is 
being designed. In function of this aspect, the IDSs are classified depending of where the 
packages are captured or the scope of the IDS. The main types are:
• Network-Based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS): Acquire data from the network.
• Host-Based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS): Acquire data from inside a computer.
 3.4.2.1 Network-Based Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs)
Most of the Intrusion Detection Systems are Network-Based (NIDS). The NIDSs, like a 
network analyzer, captures all the traffic destined to the network and, in real time or close to 
real  time,  examine network-level,  transport-level  and/or  application-level  protocol  activity 
packet  by  packet.  Once  the  information  of  the  packet  has  been  read  into  memory,  the 
signature of this is analyzed in order to check if it has an acceptable signature or not. If the 
signature is not acceptable, depending on the particular configuration of the NIDS, different 
measures will be done, such as:




• The NIDS can attempt to interfere with the suspicious transmission by resetting both 
ends of the connection.
• The NIDS can interact with a firewall or a router to modify the filter rules and block 
the attacking host.
A typical NIDS is formed by: sensors, which are the responsible of capture the traffic, one 
or  more  servers  for  NIDS management  functions,  and  one  or  more  consoles,  where  the 
administrator manage the sensors and run the reports. The analysis of the traffic can be done 
on the sensors, at the management server, or with a combination of both.
There are two types of sensors modes: inline and passive. The inline sensor is inserted into 
a network segment, the traffic to be monitored must pass through the sensor. To do this, it is 
possible to use a software sensor combined with a network device like a firewall or a switch, 
it is not needed another hardware device. Another option is to use a hardware sensor. 
The passive sensors monitors a copy of a network traffic redirected from the real traffic 
with a device like a hub. These sensors are running in hidden mode, receiving only traffic and 
preventing physically any outgoing signal, so it is more difficult for an attacker to determine 
where  these  sensors  are  located  and that  are  present.  These  sensors  are  used  more  often 
because do not add an extra packet delay.
An important decision that an administrator has to take is where to place the sensors. 
Figure 6 shows different possibilities where deploy the sensors.[9]
A common location is to place the sensor inside the external firewall (location 1 in Figure 
6). The advantages of this position are:
• It  is  possible  to  see the attacks  from the outside world that  penetrate  the external 
firewall.
• Detect problems with the network firewall policies.
• Capture attacks that might target the external serves.
• Even if the attacks is not recognized, the IDS can sometime recognize the outgoing 
traffic that results from the compromised server.
Another possibility is to locate the sensor between the external firewall and the Internet 
(location 2), monitoring all the network traffic before filter it. At this position the sensor has 
the highest load, because have to analyze all the traffic destined to the network, so must have 
a big capacity of work, which have a big economical cost. The advantage of this position is:
• Documents  number  and  types  of  attacks  originated  on  the  Internet  that  target  the 
network.
A sensor locate at  the position 3, which works in addition with some of the externals 
sensors, is monitor the traffic destined to the internal servers and database resources.  The 
benefits are:
• Detects unauthorized activity by authorized users withing the organization's security 
perimeter.




Finally, the sensor situated at the location 4, add additional protection to each specific 
LAN like personal or financial networks. The advantages of these sensors are:
• Detects attacks targeting critical systems and resources.
• Allows focusing  of  limited  resources  to  the  network  assets  considered  of  greatest 
value.
As with a sensor at location 3, a sensor at location 4 usually is configured to analyze 
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specific protocols and attack types, reducing the processing load.
A NIDS has the following advantages and disadvantages[37]:
Advantages:
• Because the NIDS can monitor traffic at the transport layer, this kind of IDS are able 
to detect attacks that HIDS (explained in the next point) can detect, this is because 
NIDS can look not only at the packet addresses, also the port number from the packets 
headers.
• NIDS can be configured to be invisible to the network in order to increase the security 
against attacks.
• Because NIDS are on dedicated machines, it is more difficult for attackers to remove 
the evidence of the acts that have done.
• Ability to detect unsuccessful attacks and malicious intents. This is because the NIDS 
can be locate before the external firewall, so any traffic has been filtered before arrive 
to the NIDS' sensor.
• NIDS have a small impact on the network.
Disadvantages:
• The NIDS have no capabilities to  decrypt  encrypted data.  This  is  one of  it  major 
weaknesses.
• NIDS only know that the attacks have been launched, not if these attacks have been 
successful.
• The sensors analyses the headers and content of the packets, by this, the sensors may 
have difficulties processing the traffic of large networks.
• NIDS have problems with network-based attacks traveling in fragmented packets.
Some examples of attacks detectable by the NIDS using signature detection are[38]:
• Application layer reconnaissance and attacks. Some of the application layer protocols 
analyzed by NIDS looking for attacks like buffer overflows, password guessing. are: 
DHCP, DNS, FTP, HTTP, IMAP, IRC, NFS, POP, SMB.
• Transport  layer  reconnaissance and attacks.  Some examples  of  attacks  are  unusual 
packet fragmentation, scans for vulnerable ports. In order to detect this attacks NIDS 
analyze TCP and UDP traffic and other transport layer protocols.
• Network layer reconnaissance and attacks. Some protocols analyzed by NIDS at this 
level are IPv4, ICMP, IGMP. At this layer are looking for attacks like IP spoofing, 
illegal IP header values.
• Unexpected application services. NIDS try to determine if the activity on a transport 
connection is consistent with the expected application protocol. An example is a host 
running an unauthorized application service.
• Policy  violations.  NIDS  try  to  detect  use  of  inappropriate  web  sites  and  use  of 
forbidden application protocols.
Some examples of attacks detectable using anomaly detection techniques are[38]:




traffic or significantly increase connection attempts, flowing the target system.
• Scanning. Occurs when an attacker sends different kind of packets against a system 
with the purpose to get many of the system's characteristics and vulnerabilities.
• Worms. Worms can be detected because use large amounts of bandwidth when are 
trying  to  be  propagated.  Worms  also  can  be  detected  because  can  cause  hosts  to 
communicate with each other that typically do not, or use of hosts ports that normally 
are not used.
An example of NIDS is Snort[39].
 3.4.2.2 Host-Based Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDSs)
HIDSs were the first type of IDSs developed and implemented. HIDSs were designed to 
protect vulnerable or sensitive systems like database servers or administrative servers running 
as a background process on the system. HIDS analyzes the information obtained from inside 
of the computer, such as, system event, and security logs on Windows systems and syslog in 
Unix environments. When a change is detected in some of these logs, the HIDS compares it 
with its configured attacks signatures. When suspicious activity is detected, the IDS attempt to 
terminate the attacking session and send an alert to the system administrator.
The fact that the HIDS analyze directly information of a system made possible determine 
exactly which process and which users are involved in a particular attack.
Some advantages of HIDS are:
• HIDS, analyzing local events of a host, can detect attacks that can not be detected by 
NIDS.
• Since HIDS analyze the information before and or after that the data is encrypted, 
HIDSs are able to work in an environment in which network traffic travels encrypted.
• Ability to verify if an attack has been successful or not.
Some of the disadvantages are:
• HIDS have to be configured at each monitored host.
• The HIDS could be disable after an successful attack.
• Since are deploy at a host, HIDSs have very limited view of the network so are not 
able to detect attacks on an entire network.
• HIDS uses resources of the host that are monitoring, influencing in the performance.
It is possible to collect information from two or more HIDS and centralize it, knowing this 
IDS as multi-host-based systems. This system has the difficulty of coordinate the data from 
several sources.
An example of HIDS is Osiris[40].
 3.4.3 Type of response
It is related with how the IDS react after an attack has been detected. The IDS can be:




• Active IDS: Automatically send replies to the attacks.
 3.4.3.1 Passive response
This  type  of  IDS,  after  detect  an  attack,  only has  the  mission  of  inform the  security 
responsible who will analyze the attack an will take the correspondent measures if are needed.
This IDS need the constant supervision of someone in order to take a measure as soon as 
possible preventing that the attack get it purpose.
 3.4.3.2 Active response
Active IDS, furthermore than alert the administrator after the detection of an attack, will 
take a predefined proactive action to respond against the threat, this kind of IDS is know as 
IPS. The typical action the IPS will take can be categorized as following:
• Collect additional information: After the detection of an attack, the IPS will increment 
the sensitive of the sensor in order to get more information about the attacker.  An 
example could be catch all the packets generated by the source of the attack.
• Act against the attack: the IPS will stop the attack, for example, in the case of a TCP 
connection, the session can be closed by injecting TCP RST to the attacker and the 
victim, or send an order to the router or firewall to filter the IP address of the intruder.
Due to time and resources limitations, has not been possible the explanation of this kind of 
intrusion detection systems.
 3.4.4 Detection time
Two types of IDS can be differentiate, those which detect intrusions on real-time (in-line),  
and those which process the data captured by the sensors of the IDS with some delay (off-
line). Some IDSs have both functionalities, can be in-line IDS and furthermore can analyze 
historic audit data.
Figure 7 shows a brief review of the IDS classification.
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 3.5 IDS architecture
An IDS is composed by different parts. Each part do different task all of them necessary 
for  the  global  functionality  of  the  Intrusion  Detection  System.  Some parts  have  to  work 
sequentially but others are able to work in parallel. Figure 8 shows an schema of this  basic 
parts which are[38]:
• Load balancer: All the traffic of the network goes through it. Used by NIDS, it is the 
responsible  to  collect  data  from the  network  and  distributes  it  to  all  the  network 
sensors. It can be implemented by mean of software or an specific hardware.
• Network sensor: Is a computer program that runs on dedicated machines or network 
devices which purpose is to capture all the traffic that goes through it.
In network without load balancers, the sensors must be placed in a point where all the 
traffic of the segment of the network, which the sensor is responsible, goes through it.
• Analyzer: Receives the data from the sensors, and it is the responsible to classified this 
data in secure or insecure, determining the threat level of the insecure data.
• Alert notifier: When a threat has been detected an it level of risk is higher than a level 
designed  in  the  organization's  security  policy,  an  alert  is  sent  to  the  security 
responsible for handling incidents. Standard alerts are screen alerts, audible alerts, e-
mail alerts.
• Command console: Is from where the the entire system is controlled. It is typically a 
dedicated machine with a set of tools for setting policy and processing collected alerts.
• Response subsystem: Provides the capabilities to take an action when an attack is 
received. The response can be automatic or launched by the system operator. Not all 
the IDS has this ability.
• Database: Is the repository of all the intrusion that has been detected. It is useful to 
generate statistics which are necessary to model historical behavior patterns.
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 3.6 Why use an IDS?
Think in a thief that is trying to enter in a house. The thief tries to enter by the front door 
but it is looked. Then the thief tries to enter by the windows, but it is looked too. The house 
seem to be secure, so, why to install an alarm?. The answer is simple, because one day it is 
possible that someone forget to lock properly all the entries to the house, or one entry is 
leaved unlocked deliberately. 
The same question could be asked by a network administrator. Why to install an IDS if the 
system have  firewalls,  all  the  operating  systems  are  patched,  the  passwords  are  checked 
looking for weakness? Apparently the system is secure but, like in the example of the house, 
what happen if the administrator forget to update a rule of the firewall or do it incorrectly, or  
what happen if a discontent employee leave some backdoor, or unconsciously an user open a 
mail with a malware?
Even with the best protection systems, the houses and the computers are not 100 percent 
secure. In the case of the computer science, most security experts ensure that with the fact of 
give to the users features like network connectivity, a system will never be completely secure.
So, only by the fact that the systems are used by humans, and humans are not perfects, the 
network administrator must keep in mind than sooner or later, intentionally or not, someone 
will done a fail and probably an attacker will be aware of that an will try to attack the system. 
At this moment, the only important thing is to detect it as soon as possible. The main purpose 
of the IDS is detect this fails or attacks, alert the administrators and sometime take its own 
measures.
 3.7 IDS limitations
There is no an IDS model that is able to offer 100% intrusion detection. Some of the 
limitations of the IDS are the following[41]:
• The fact that the IDSs operate comparing the actual behavior of a network with a 
predefined normal behavior, provoke a huge number of false alarms, False positives or 
False negatives. This is because the users have an unpredictable behavior and someday 
can do some action different from the habitual acts causing an alert in the IDS by the 
detection of this unusual behavior.
In fact,  an Anomaly-Based IDS with a  rate  of  20 false  alarms  to 1 real  intrusion 
detection is considered good.
• Anomaly-Based IDS require of an extensive training set of network or system event 
logs in order to characterize normal behavior. In recent companies or companies that 
usually do not save the logs of the system, it is needed certain time to recollect enough 
data in order to train the IDS.
• New attacks or polymorphic attacks are not detectable until a signature of it has been 
generated and the IDS has been updated with it.  Anomaly-Based IDS with a good 
training could solve this problem.
• The IDS are really exigent with the resources requirements of the system where are 
implemented. This is because IDSs have to process in real time huge quantities of 
data. This is specially true in high networks.
• In a state of overload, the IDS are not able to analyze in real-time all the traffic of the 




• IDS  are  not  able  to  detect  sophisticated  attacks  such  as  packet  fragmentation 
techniques.
• Although usually is difficult to detect the position of the IDS, experimental attackers 
could find it  and instantaneously will  launch a  direct  attack against  it.  This  direct 
attack can not be blocked by the IDS and will disable it.
• Each system where the IDS are implemented has its own characteristics, the IDS must 
be configured and adapted to the particularities of each system.
• Network-Based IDS are not able to analyze encrypted communication.
• Depending of the position of the IDS, this one could cause that a trusted packet do not 
arrive to the network. For example, when a packet with TTL one arrive to the IDS this 
packet will be accepted by the IDS but the router of the organization will discard it.
• Since the switches only send the traffic to the devices where it is addressed, for an IDS 









One of the original honeypot stories comes from “The cuckoo's Egg”, a book by Clifford 
Stoll. In 1980's, a cracker has been traced to Germany, but all attempts to pinpoint him further 
were frustrated by the German phone system, which is based on analog circuits and tracing a 
connection  takes  time.  To  keep  the  cracker  on  the  line,  Clifford  builds  a  series  of  fake 
computer files that purport to detail a new secret plane in development by the U.S. Military. 
The efforts  of Clifford pays  off:  the cracker  was so fascinated by the drawings and fake 
information that stayed connected long enough for his phone call to be traced.
One important thing to be able to enhance the security of the systems is to know the last  
techniques used by the attackers. One way to get this valuable information for the system 
administrators is to install trap applications in the machines, like did Clifford Stoll, in order to  
register suspicious  activities without attackers notice that are being examined. This is  the 
basic functionality of the honeypots.
Honeypots are a relatively recent innovation in intrusion detection technology. Honeypots 
are applications, more or less interactive, that emulate some application or service of a system 
and register the suspicious activity than attacker could launch against them. Obviously, the 
information served by this emulated applications are apparently important information about 
the company in order to distract the attackers for the real systems and give some extra time to 
the administrator to take some temporal measure. This kind of application will never have 
sensible information about the company and must always be properly isolated from the real 
systems to prevent attacks from these to the internal systems. Are designed to:
• Divert an attacker from accessing critical systems.
• Collect information about the attacker's activity.
• Encourage the attacker to stay on the system enough time to lend the administrators to 
respond.
 4.1 Types of honeypots
Marty Roesch, developer  of Snort,  classified the honeypots in two general categories: 
production honeypots and research honeypots. Production honeypots protect an organization, 
while research honeypots are used to learn.[14]
Production honeypots: have the purpose of enhance the security of a system alerting 
when some attacks  is  being launched against  them. This  kind of  honeypots  are  easier  to 
implement  than  research  honeypots  because  need  less  functionality.  However,  production 
honeypots give to the users less information about the attacks and the attackers. With these 
honeypots, it is possible to know what exploits the attackers are launching against the system 
and from where are attacking.
Research honeypots: have the objective of learn as much information as possible. That is 
why is not enough only with emulate some services or application and it is necessary to offer 
to the attackers a real computer system and application which interact with them. With these 
kind of honeypots, is possible to learn much more, such as how the tools of the attacker are  
developed. The disadvantages are that this kind of honeypots are more complex and have 
more risk than the production honeypots if  an attackers get a complete control  about  the 




Not always the implementation of each kind of honeypot is really different. At the end, the 
easiest way to know the type of a honeypot it will depend of the functionality and purpose of 
it. For example, a production honeypot capture all the activity of an attacker and after detect 
the activity of an attacker, block the attack and alert the administrators. The same honeypot as 
a research system try to know the tools that the attacker is using, the origin of the attack, and 
the activity of the attacker after the honeypot has been compromised.
 4.2 Levels of interaction
Honeypots can be categorized in function of the level of interaction that are offering to 
attackers. This level of interaction is related with what it is wanted to do with the honeypots: 
detect unauthorized activities, catch the attackers in action and learn about the tools, tactics 
that are using.
Addison Wesley classified the honeypots in three different levels of interaction[14]: low-
interaction honeypots, medium-interaction honeypots, and high-interaction honeypots. 
 4.2.1 Low-interaction honeypots
The  honeypot  emulate  a  service,  application  or  a  vulnerable  system.  This  basic 
functionality  make  this  kind  of  honeypots  the  easiest  to  deploy and  maintain,  usually  is 
enough with execute a program. The administrator after  install the program, only have to 
maintain it with possible patches and monitor any alert from it. This simplicity make that this 
kind of honeypots have the lowest level of risk.
The  purpose  of  low-interaction  honeypot  is  only  detect  unauthorized  scans  or 
unauthorized connection attempts giving information about the date and moment of the attack, 
the source and destination IP and port of the attacker.
Some examples are:
• Honeyd[15]: Maybe one of the easiest  and popular honeypots. It is a daemon that 
creates virtual hosts on a network. This virtual host can be configured to run arbitrary 
services, and can be configured to simulate to be running certain operating system.
• HoneyC[16]: The purpose of this honeypot is to find malicious servers on a network. 
To do this, it is formed by three components:Queuer, Visitor, and Analysis Engine. The 
Queuer generate a server queue for interact with the Visitor. The request of the visitor 
are enqueued to be processes and answered. Finally, after the interaction between the 
Visitor and a server, the Analysis Engine evaluate if some security policy have been 
violated.
• Glastopf[17]:  Glastopf  emulates  thousand  of  vulnerabilities  to  collect  data  from 
attacks against web application such as remote file inclusion, SQL injection, local file 
inclusion. It functionality is simple, it scan the incoming request searching string like 
"=http://" or "=ftp://". When some request is recognized like dangerous, Glastopf try to 
download and analyze the file and respond to the expectations of the attackers. If the 
attackers  send  a  bot,  shell,  spreader,  the  honeypot  will  get  information  with  the 
purpose to avoid a successful attack against the real systems with the same technique.
Once this kind of honeypot has been indexed by search engines, thousand of attacks 
could be launched against it.




order  to  do  this,  it monitors  the  network  stream for  incoming  sessions  and starts 
appropriate listeners just in time. Each listener can handle multiple connections and 
terminates  itself  after  some idle  time.   services.  It  is  focus  in  catching  the  initial 
exploit.
 4.2.2 Medium-interaction honeypots
Situated  in  the  middle  of  a  complexity  and  functionality  honeypots  scale,  medium-
interaction honeypots can expect certain activity and are designed to give certain response 
beyond than a low-interaction honeypot. For example, in a emulation of a web server, while a 
low-interaction honeypot  simply present  an HTTP banner,  a medium-interaction honeypot 
could be customized to present whatever specific functionality or behavior. This possibility to 
customize the honeypot, make possible to get information more interesting like the payload 
launched  by  a  worm,  than  only  detect  unauthorized  scans  or  unauthorized  connection 
attempts.
Since the services offered by this kind of honeypots are emulated too, the risk of these 
compared with the low-interaction honeypots is not much more greater.
The main inconvenient  to  implement  these honeypots is  the huge complexity and big 
difficulties to configure them properly increasing the risk that something could go wrong and 
an attacker get advantage of this mistake. A great amount of work is needed to configure a 
honeypot that emulate an specific functionality of an application.
The main  advantage  is  that,  with  less  risk than  with  high-interaction  honeypots,  it  is 
possible to get interesting information such as payloads launched against an specific system, 
how the attacker elevate privilege, the tools of an attacker.
Some examples are:
• Nephentes[19]: It is used to emulate vulnerabilities used by the worms to spread. Once 
a  worm is  trying  to  use  some  of  the  vulnerabilities  emulated  by  Nephentes,  this 
honeypot will capture it to study it behavior.
• mwcollectd[20]: It is a malware collection daemon. It is based in the best features of 
Nephentes and honeytrap.
• Multipot[21]: It is a honeypot for Windows. It emulate weak point under Windows 
with the purpose to collect worms.
 4.2.3 High-interaction honeypots
High-interaction honeypots are the extreme of honeypot technologies and are able to track 
all the actions of the attackers, giving really relevant information about the new techniques of 
the  attackers.  This  information  is  very  important  to  protect  the  real  systems  of  the 
organization. 
The only thing that difference this kind of honeypots from a normal systems is that these 
honeypost have not production value. By this fact, this security tools have an immense level 
of risk because when attackers have control of one of this honeypots, the attackers have a 
fully operation system to interact with being able to attack other system or capture production 
activity.  To  mitigate  this  risk,  high-interaction  honeypots  usually  are  placed  within  a 
controlled  environment,  in  many cases  behind a  firewall.  This  firewall  must  be  properly 




uses  the  honeypot  to  launch  attacks  to  other  system  situated  outside  of  a  controlled 
infrastructure.
This level of interaction with the attackers make this kind of honeypots extremely difficult 
to install and configure. A variety of technologies are involved such as firewall and IDS. This 
complex system have an high level of risk.
Some examples are:
• HIHAT[22]:  The  High  Interaction  Honeypot  Analysis  Toolkit  (HIHAT)  allows  to 
transform  arbitrary  PHP  applications  into  web-based  high-interaction  Honeypots. 
Some  of  this  PHP  applications  are  PHPNuke[23],  PHPMyAdmin[24], 
OSCommerce[25]. Furthermore a graphical user interface is provided which supports 
the process of monitoring the Honeypot and analysing the acquired data.
Some of the features of HIHAT are automatic scans for know attacks, detects SQL-
Injections, detects File-Inclusions, provides a geographical IP-based mapping about 
the attack sources, saves copies of malicious tools for later studies.
• HoneyBow[26]:  It  is  a  malware  collection  toolkit  and  can  be  integrated  with 
Nephentes to build a collection tool much more complete.
• Sebek[27]:  It  works  like  a  Host-based  Intrusion  Detection  System  (HIDS).  It  is 
designed  to  capture  attacker's  activities  on  a  honeypot.  It  is  formed  by  two 
components.  The  first  is  a  client  that  runs  on  the  honeypots  which  purpose  is  to 
capture the attacker's activities (for example: keystroke, file upload, passwords). The 
second component is the server that collects the data from the honeypot.
• Capture-HPC[28]: Like HoneyC, is a honeyclient with the purpose to find malicious 
servers on a network. When it founds a malicious server, by means of a dedicated 
virtual machine, this server is observed searching some change in it system state. 
An organization interested on implement some honeypot, must be conscious of the risk 
that this security tools will add to the systems. First of all must define the use that is going to  
give  to  the  honeypot  and  after  that,  in  function  of  the  experience  of  the  administration, 
implement  the  correspondent  honeypot.  If  the  administrator  has  no  experience  with  this 
systems, it is recommended to start with low-interaction honeypots and with the time try to 
implement a honeypot with greater level of interaction but, always knowing what is being 
done  because  the  more  interaction  allowed  to  the  attacker,  the  more  that  can  go  wrong 
converting a security tool in an attacker tool.
 4.3 Where to place a honeypot
There  are  different  possibilities  to  deploy  a  honeypot.  Figure  9 shows  some  of  this 
possibilities. The location depend of different factors such as the type of information that the 
honeypot has to track, the level of risk tolerable.
A honeypot situated on the option 1, outside the external firewall, does not increase the 
risk for the internal network, and reduce the alerts of the firewalls and internal IDS. In this 
position, the honeypot is useful to track attempts of connection and study the new vectors of 
the attackers.
The second option, situated in the DMZ, has the disadvantages that the other system of 
this  segment  of  the  network,  can  be  harm if  do  not  have  the  properly security.  Another 




The third option, represent a fully internal honeypot. The most important advantage is that 
it can catch internal attacks and detect a bad configuration on firewalls, for example, if the 
firewall allow unnecessary traffic from the Internet to the internal system. The most serious 
disadvantages is that if the honeypot is compromised the internal system can be attacked.
 4.4 Honeynets
The extreme of high-interaction honeypot are the honeynets. Honeynet is a network of 
honeypots. The complexity of the honeynets lies on the design of a controlled network that 
control and captures all the activity in all the honeypots. The advantage of honeynets is that 
are able to capture the greatest level of information on any platform that exist.  Figure  10 
shows a possible topology for a honeynet.
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Figure 9: Example of Honeypot Deployment
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Following are explained the different part of a honeynet:
• The honeywall operates in mode bridge and offer mechanisms to capture, analyze and 
control data.
• Data control:  When attackers  get  the control  of a honeynet  will  try to  use all  the 
systems to attack and harm another systems. The purpose of the data control is to 
mitigate this risk. To do this, it  is necessary to get a balance between the freedom 
allowed to the attackers to act in the honeynet and how much the hacker activity is 
restricted.  The use of  a  firewall  properly configured is  one of  the solution to  this 
problem.
• Data capture: It is the monitoring and logging of all the activities within the honeynet 
with the purpose to analyze and learn the tools, tactics, and motives of attackers. It is  
recommended to capture data in different levels of the networks. Some of these levels 
are:
◦ The register of the Firewall: It is really important to have a log of all the traffic 
controlled by the Firewall.  It  is the critical point and where is possible get the 
greater amount of information about the attackers.
◦ The network traffic: All the packets content (payloads) generated outside or inside 
of the network must be captured. The most indicated tool to do this is an IDS (is 
explained in the next section).
◦ Activity in  the system:  More important  information can be extracted from the 
activity  in  the  honeypot.  One  option  to  do  this  could  be  the  use  of  a  high-
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Figure 10: Honeynet Topology[75]
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interaction honeypot like Sebek which capture all the keystroke.
• System monitoring: As important as track all the data of the network is monitoring that 
all the components of the system are working properly. A server put down, an excess 
in the network traffic, an overload of the CPU are sign that the system can be suffering 
an attack. To detect this as soon as possible, it is recommended the use of monitoring 
tools like Nagios[29].
• Data analysis: The entire purpose of a honeynet is to get information about attacks and 
attackers. The easiest way to do this, is to centralized the log generated by all the 
honeypots  and all  the  tools  used  in  the  honeynet.  By means  of  log  analyzer  like 








 5 Penetration testing
The use of all the possible security tools, do not prevent that presence of vulnerabilities. In 
order to detect these possible vulnerabilities, is recommended execute a penetration testing 
periodically.
“Risk assessment is a critical first-step in the information security lifecycle. Network  
penetration  testing  offers  an  invaluable  way  to  establish  a  baseline  assessment  of  
security  as  it  appears  from  outside  the  organization's  network  boundaries.  A  
penetration  test  involves  gathering  information  about  an organization's  information  
systems  and  security  infrastructure,  and  then  using  this  information  to  attempt  to  
identify and then exploit known or potential security vulnerabilities.”[42]
The principal objective of penetration testing is to determine security weaknesses in an 
organization's network infrastructure. A variety of actions are performed to determine these 
security weaknesses, some of these actions are: 
• Social engineering: Consist in collect all the possible information about a company by 
means of a serial  of questions executed to  the employees who unconsciously give 
important information via mail, telephone to the fictitious attackers.
• External Penetration Testing: A evaluation of the the firewalls,  routers, IDS of the 
company are carried out.
• Client  side  Exploitation:  A collection  of  actual  attacks  are  performed  against  the 
company.
• VPN testing: Vulnerabilities or weaknesses are searched in the VPN.
When  all  the  test  are  finished,  a  report  is  send to  the  company which  will  provides 
information like:
• A detailed analysis of the existing and relevant vulnerabilities that have been found 
and how could been exploited.
• A report about the effectiveness of the actual security measures.
• Demonstration of the existing risks of the organization's networks and systems.
• If it is necessary justify a security program to correct the actual faults.
• A collection of remedies to prevent future vulnerabilities.
To carry out this Penetration Testings different strategies can be used, these strategies are:
• External testing strategy: Performed from outside the organization's systems (Internet), 
the attacks are targeting to the network perimeter.
• Internal testing strategy: Performed from within the organization's environment, the 
purpose  is  detect  what  an  attack  from someone  who  has  penetrated  the  network 
perimeter or an internal employer could do.
At the same time, both strategies can be classified depending of the knowledge that the 
“attackers” have about the target and the information that system administrators have bout the 
tests. The test could:
• Blind testing: The responsible to carried out the test, do not have or have a limited 




• Double blind testing: It is an extension of the blind testing in which the security staff 
of the organization are not notified about the testing activities. This kind of tests have 
double purpose: evaluate the organization security and evaluate the capabilities of the 
security responsible to detect and act in front an attack target against the systems.
In order  to get  a  successful  penetration test,  it  is  necessary to  guide it  with a  formal 
methodology which provide a base do a complete and accurate penetration test. One of the 
most  well-know  methodologies  is  Open  Source  Security  Methodology  Manual[43] 
(OSSTMM). Quoting Pete Herzog, OSSTMM creator:
“The primary goal of the OSSTMM is to provide transparency. It provides transparency  
of  those  who  have  inadequate  security  configurations  and  policies.  It  provides  
transparency  of  those  who  perform  inadequate  security  and  penetration  tests.  It  
provides transparency of the unscrupulous security vendors vying to sponge up every  
last cent of their prey’s already meager security budget; those who would side-step  
business  values  with  over-hyped  threats  of  legal  compliancy,  cyber-terrorism,  and  
hackers.
The OSSTMM is everyone's free, thorough tool to measure security inadequacies. For  
added value we include the ethical guidelines to separate professional security testers  
from those who are looking to just make some money. The OSSTMM exists because  
over  600  security  volunteers  worldwide  cared  enough  to  be  involved  in  making  
practical, affordable security less of a lottery prize and more of a daily reality."
The  OSSTMM describe  what  to  do  before,  during,  and  after  a  security  test,  how to 








OSSTMM has become a de-facto methodology for penetration testing but it is possible to 
find others standards and guidelines like: ISACA, CHECK, OWASP.
 5.1 Penetration testing phases
In order to get a successful test of intrusion, it has to be planed previously. Broadly, all test 
of intrusion must have clearly differentiate the following phases[44]:
• Planning and preparation: It is the first action that must be done in all the penetration 
testing to make it a success. A collection of meeting between the company and the 
penetration tester are done. In theses meeting the objective and work guidelines of the 
penetration tests are establish. 
Some  common  work  guidelines  are:  the  scope  of  the  penetration  test  (machines, 
systems, network involved), the form to present the results of the tests, the timing and 





• Information Gathering and Analysis:  When the necessary planning and preparation 
with the organization have finished, is time to collect as much information as possible 
about  the  targeted  systems  or  networks.  Usually,  this  phase  begins  searching 
information of Internet databases, DNS registries, WHOIS databases, Google, on-line 
news,  etc.  A good online  resource  is  available  at  http://news.netcraft.com/.  In  this 
website it is possible to find information like the operation system that is running on a 
server, the last update, last reboot. An example of a probe done to www.kth.se is show 
in the Appendix I.
Another more complete method is to do a network survey with the purpose to detect 
the hosts that are reachable doing a network map. Once adequate information about 
the network is done, the next task is to do a port scanning, getting information about 
the open and close ports on each system previously detected. Some tools to do this are 
explained in the point 5.2.1.
• Vulnerability  detection:  Once  the  relevant  information  about  the  systems  of  the 
organization  have  been  collected,  the  next  step  is  to  determine  the  possible 
vulnerabilities presents in each system. To do this, a manual vulnerability scanning 
will be done in each system by the penetration tester. Depending on the ability and 
knowledge of the testers, the results will be successful or not.
There are some vulnerabilities tools, some of them explained in the point 5.2.2, which 
automate the vulnerability scanning process helping the penetration testers, but always 
the personal abilities of the testers will give a better or worse results.
The result of the vulnerability detection will give a list of target to investigate in depth.
• Penetration attempt:  After the vulnerability detection phase has finished, is time to 
identify suitable targets for a penetration attempt. Knowing that a vulnerability exist 
do not means that it can be exploitable easily, by this reason, it is really important to 
choose properly the targets, an incorrect election will cause a waste of time and efforts 
for the penetration testers. This is really important because a timing and duration have 
been previously established.
Some of  the action carried out  in  this  phase are:  launch exploits  against  knowing 
vulnerabilities,  password  cracking  methods,  social  engineering,  test  the  physical 
security. Some tools that automate this actions are explained in the point 5.2.3.
• Analysis and reporting: This phase is focused in generate a report for the organization 
with all the result of the task above explained. In this reports will appear the following 
information:  detailed  list  of  all  the  vulnerabilities  that  have  been  found  with  the 
description  of  each  vulenrability,  suggestion  and  techniques  to  resolve  these 
vulnerabilities, summary of any successful penetration.
• Cleaning up: Consist in clean the result of all the actions carried out in the penetration 
test. This phase is vital to prevent that new vulnerabilities and new weaknesses will be 
exploited by real attackers. One example is to remove user accounts created in this 
process by the testers. 
To be able to accomplish this action successfully, it is necessary that all the action 





 5.2 Penetration testing tools
A  possible  classification  of  the  tools  used  to  perform  a  test  of  intrusion  are: 
reconnaissance tools, vulnerability detection and penetration tools.[45]
In the following points are explained some interesting security tools, a more complete list 
can be found at http://www.packetstormsecurity.com/.
 5.2.1 Reconnaissance tools
This tools are used in the phase “Information Gathering and Analysis” of a penetration test 
with the purpose to build the network diagram. Some of this tools are briefly explained in the 
next points.
 5.2.1.1 Nmap
Nmap[46] or “Network Mapper” is a utility for network exploration or security auditing. 
It was designed to rapidly scan large networks, but works fine against single hosts. It is able to 
determine what operating systems are running on a network, what services are offered in each 
host, what type of packet filters/firewalls are in use, and numerous other characteristics.
 5.2.1.2 Hping
Is a network tool oriented TCP/IP packet assembler/analyzer. Hping[47] is able to send 
custom TCP/IP packets and to display target replies, handle fragmentation, arbitraty packets 
body  and  size  and  can  be  used  in  order  to  transfer  files  encapsulated  under  supported 
protocols. Somethings able to do with hping are:
• Testing firewall rules.
• Advanced port scanning.
• Network  testing  using  different  protocols,  packet  size,  TOS (type  of  service)  and 
fragmentation.
• Manual path MTU discovery.
• Advanced traceroute under all the supported protocols.
• Remote OS fingerprinting.
• TCP/IP auditing.
 5.2.1.3 Netcat
Netcat or nc is a network tool which reads and write data across network connections 
using the TCP/IP protocol. It can open TCP connections, send UDP packets, listen on arbitraty 
TCP and UDP ports, do port scanning.
 5.2.1.4 Wireshark
Wireshark[48] is a network protocol analyzer. It allow the users to see all traffic being 
passed over the network by putting the network interface into promiscuous mode being able 




specified by different networking protocols. Some other characteristics are:
• Support hundred of protocols, with more being added all the time.
• Live capture and offline analysis.
• Powerful filter.
• Description support for many protocols. 
 5.2.1.5 Firewalk
Firewalk is a network auditing tool that attempts to determine what transport protocols a 
given gateway will pass. Firewalk works by sending out TCP or UDP packets with a TTL one 
greater than the targeted gateway. If the gateway allows the traffic, it will forward the packets 
to  the  next  hop  where  an  ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED message  will  be  send  back.  If  the 
gateway host does not allow the traffic, it will likely drop the packets on the floor and it will 
see no response. 
 5.2.2 Vulnerability detection
This tools are used in the phase “Vulnerability detection” of a penetration test with the 
purpose to find the possible vulnerabilities presents in each system. Some of this tools are 
briefly explained in the next points.
 5.2.2.1 Nessus
Nessus[49]  is  a  active  security  scanner  that  audit  remotely  a  network  providing  a 
snapshot, the vulnerabilities, configuration and sensitive data of the network.
One  of  the  most  important  characteristic  is  that  it  provides  a  list  of  the  existent 
vulnerabilities in a network an the steps that should be taken to address these vulnerabilities.
 5.2.2.2 SARA
SARA[50]  (Security  Auditor's  Research  Assistant)  is  a  vulnerability  assessment  tool 
derived from the SATAN (Security Administrator's Tool for Analyzing Networks). Some of its 
characteristic are:
• Integrate the National Vulnerability Database[51] (NVD).
• Performs SQL injection test.
• Can adapt to many firewalled environmentes.
• Support remote self scan.
• Performs exhaustive XSS tests.
 5.2.2.3 Strobe
Strobe locates and describes all listening TCP ports on a host.
Due to the importance of a vulnerability detector in the task of the network administrators 





 5.2.3 Penetration tools
This  tools  are  used  in  the  phase  “Penetration  attempt”  of  a  penetration  test  with  the 
purpose to verify if the vulnerabilities of the systems can be exploited. Some kind of this tools 
are briefly explained in the next points with some examples.
 5.2.3.1 Password cracker
Passwords cracker are applications which by mean of brute-force, cryptanalysis attacks, 
using dictionary, etc. are able to recovery passwords sniffed on the network or get with some 
fraudulent system. Some examples are: Cain & Abel, John the Ripper, TCH-Hydra, aircrack.
 5.2.3.2 Injection attacks
Injection flaws, such as SQL, OS, LDAP injections, occurs when the data sends to the 
systems  is  not  correctly  filtered  which  allow  an  attacker  the  execution  of  unintended 
commands or the access to unauthorized data.
 5.2.3.3 Exploitation tools
One of the most famous application to launch exploits against some vulnerability is the 
Metasploit Framework. The framework includes hundreds of working remote exploits for a 
variety of platforms. Payload, encoders, etc. can be launched with an exploit with the purpose 




 6 Experimental part
 6.1 Purpose
The purpose of the practical part is to check how a signature detection NIDS reacts when 
the  system is  being  attacked.  Different  kinds  of  attacks  will  be  performed  to  check  the 
complexity of the attacks than an IDS is able to detect. A secondary objective, is to establish 
the bases for a possible assignment in which an IDS will be installed, configured and tested.
 6.2 Scenario
All  this  practical  part,  has  been  carried  out  in  a  virtual  working  environment  using 
VirtualBox[52] running in a machine with the following characteristics:
• OS: Ubuntu 10.04 Desktop Edition of 64 bits.
• RAM: 4 GB
• Processor: Intel Core 2 Duo CPU P8400@2.26GHz
VirtualBox has been selected to develop the virtual scenario because it has the required 
characteristic  to  build  the  virtual  environment  and  it  is  freely  available  as  Open  Source 
Software under the terms of the GNU Generic Public License(GPL).
The virtual network used in the test is formed by the next system:
• Linux Server, where the IDS (Snort) and Nessus have been installed,  which has the 
next characteristics:
◦ Version: Ubuntu 10.04 Server Edition of 32 bits
◦ RAM: 512 MB
◦ Hostname: ThesisLabUbuntuSever




◦ MySQL root password: tus2010mySQL
◦ MySQL snort password: tus2010mySQLsnort
◦ Nessus username: nessus_user
◦ Nessus user pasword: tus2010NessuS
• Windows Client, some vulnerable application have been installed in it to be attacked 
and check if the IDS is able to detect such attacks. It has the following characteristics:
◦ Version: Windows XP SP3







• Linux  Client,  from  where  all  the  attacks  have  been  carried  out,  with  the  next 
characteristics:
◦ Version: The penetration testing distribution Backtrack 4 R1[53]




The penetration testing distribution Backtrack has been selected to carried out the actions 
of  an  attacker  because  have installed  a  really good set  of  security tools  which  avoid  the 
installation of all the necessary application, making easier the execution of the tests. One very 
famous tool installed is the Metasploit framework which provides a suit of tools destined for 
penetration testing, security researchers, and IDS signature developers.
Figure 11 shows a diagram of the virtual network. As is explained in the point 6.3.1 , has 
been necessary to build a network in which the systems are connected through a virtual hub.
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Snort  is  the  IDS  selected  to  do  all  the  test.  An  analysis  of  how  to  install,  a  basic 
configuration, and its results are explained in this section.
Snort was created by Martin Roesch in 1998. Actually, it is one of the most popular open 
source  network  detection  system.  It  is  able  to  analyze  the  TCP/IP datagram traffic  on  a 
network in real time. Snort can be configured to run in different modes. These modes are:
• Sniffer mode: read and display in a console the packets of the network.
• Packet logger mode: logs the packets to disk.
• Intrusion Detection System mode: analyze network traffic looking for some possible 
attack against the system. This is the mode used in the tests.
Some of the characteristics that have done snort so popular are:
• The possibility to connect it with the most important databases such as PostgreSQL, 
MySql, Oracle.
• A huge variety of complements  to make easier  the analysis  of the results  such as 
BASE[54] (Basic Analysis and Security Engine), Barnyard[55].
• An easy,  powerful,  and  clean  rule  creation  language,  with  several  packs  of  rule-
packages  against  Dos,  Nmap,  backdoors,  etc.  which  can  be  downloaded  from the 
Snort homepage[39].
• It is multi-platform, compatible with Unix, Linux and Windows SO.
• Periodical updates with the signatures of the latest know-attacks.
 6.3.1 Installation and Configuration
Snort has been installed in the Linux Server. Assuming that Ubuntu 10.04 server is already 
installed, the next step to install snort has been to configure properly the virtual network. One 
particularity of the IDS is  that  all  the traffic of the network has to arrive to the network 
interface of the machine where the IDS is installed. In order to the IDS do it function sniffing 
and analyzing all the traffic of the network to detect a possible attack, this is a necessary 
characteristic in the network configuration where it is installed. The typical way to do this is 
configure the port of the switch where the IDS is connected in mirroring mode(SPAN port).
[56] With this configuration in the switch, all the traffic that goes throw it is resend to the 
SPAN port. Due to the resource limitations, has been not possible to use a switch which this 
characteristic  and  has  been  necessary  to  do  a  trick  in  the  network  configuration  of  the 
VirtualBox. This trick consist in configure the network of the virtual machines in “Host-only 
adapter” mode.[57][58] With this configuration the network works like if all the machines 
will be connected to a hub. By the properties of a hub[59], this configuration is valid to do test 
like this, but not to implement it in a real network.
To continue with the installation of snort,  it  is  necessary to give temporally access to 
Internet to the Virtual Machine. Once the Virtual Machine has Internet connection, first of all 
some required software have to be installed[60]:
• Libpcap: pcap (packet capture) consist in an API for capturing network traffic. Unix 




• PCRE:  Perl  Compatible  Regular  Expressions  is  a  regular  expression  C  library 
necessary for some open-source programs such as the Apache HTTP Server, the PHP 
scripting language, and Snort.
• Libnet: Generic networking API that provides access to several protocols.
• Barnyard: Snort creates a special binary output format called “unified”, barnyard reads 
this file and resend the data to a database back-end. Barnyard manages the sending of 
events to the database and stores them when the database temporarily cannot accept 
connections.
Another  required software to be able  to  access and configure snort  are:  Apache,  php, 
mysql (another database like PostgreSQL, Oracle could be used).
The following commands show how to do the installation of these packages:
• sudo apt-get install apache2
• sudo apt-get install php5
• sudo apt-get install php5-mysql
• sudo apt-get install php5-gd
• sudo apt-get install libpcap0.8-dev
• sudo apt-get install libpcre3-dev
• sudo apt-get install mysql-server
◦ During it  installation the password for  the user root  for  access  to the MySQL 
database is asked.
• sudo apt-get install lybmysqlclient16-dev
Installation of snort: after download the last version of snort from it homepage[39] (in this 
case 2.8.6.1), typin the following commands Snort will be installed:
• sudo tar zxvf snort-2.8.6.1.tar.gz
• cd snort-2.8.6.1
• sudo ./configure - -prefix=/usr/local/snort
• sudo make
• sudo make install
• sudo mkdir /var/log/snort
• sudo groupadd snort (create a new group of users)
• sudo useradd -g snort snort (create a new user in the group snort)
• sudo chown snort:snort /var/log/snort (change file and group owner)
• echo “create database snort;” | mysql -u root -p (create database for snort)
• mysql  -u  root  -p  -D  snort  <  ./schemas/create_mysql  (create  the  structure  of  the 
database needed to run snort)




identified by 'PASSWORD'” | mysql -u root -p (give privilege to the user snort in the 
database, this is a measure to prevent access to the database with the user root. The 
password used is the password of the user snort)
Once SNORT has been installed, the next step is to download the latest public Snort rules. 
To do this, first of all it is necessary to create an account on the Snort homepage[39]. There 
are  two types of users,  Subscribers,  requires a paid subscription and provides a real-time 
access to the rules and “Registered users”, which allow access during 30 days to download 
some rules of the homepage but not real-time access. For this test a “Registered user” account 
has been used. Once this account has been created and activated, the next step is to download 
the last version of the rules available for this type of users (in this case snortrules-snapshot-
2860.tar.gz). The installation of this rules can be done typing the following commands:
• sudo tar zxvf snortrules-snapshot-2860.tar.gz -C /usr/local/snort
• sudo mkdir /usr/local/snort/lib/snort_dynamicrules
• sudo  cp  /usr/local/snort/so_rules/precomplided/Debian-Lenny/i386/2.8.6.0/* 
/usr/local/snort/lib/snort_dynamicrules
At  this  point,  Snort  has  been  installed  with  its  latest  rules.  In  order  to  improve  the 
efficiency of Snort,  Barnyard2 has been installed. The following points show the steps to 
install it.
• Download the last version of Barnyard2 from it homepage[61]. In this case the version 
installed is 1.8.
• sudo tar zxvf barnyard2-1.8.tar.gz
• cd barnyard2
• sudo ./configure - -with-myslq
• sudo make
• sudo make install
• sudo cp etc/barnyard2.conf /usr/local/snort/etc
• sudo mkdir /var/log/barnyard2
• sudo chmod 666 /var/log/barnyard2
• sudo touch /var/log/snort/barnyard2.waldo
• sudo chown snort.snort /var/log/snort/barnyard2.waldo
Now, it is necessary to modify the Barnyard2 configuration file to configure it in with the 
characteristics of the machine. To do this, the following modification must to be done in the 
file /usr/local/snort/etc/barnyard2.conf:
• cp /usr/local/snort/etc/barnyard2.conf /usr/local/snort/etc/barnyard2.conf.orig
• Change the lines:
◦ config reference_file: /etc/snort/reference.config
◦ config classification_file: /etc/snort/classification.config




◦ config sid_file: /etc/snort/sid-msg.map
◦ #config hostname: thor
◦ #config interface: eth0
◦ #output  database:  log,  mysql,  user=root  password=password_from_mysql_root 
dbname=db host=localhost
By these:
◦ config reference_file: /usr/local/snort/etc/reference.config
◦ config classification_file: /usr/local/snort/etc/classification.config
◦ config gen_file: /usr/local/snort/etc/gen-msg.map
◦ config sid_file: /usr/local/snort/etc/sid-msg.map
◦ config hostname: localhost
◦ config interface: eth0
◦ output  database:  log,  mysql,  user=snort  password=password_from_user_snort 
dbname=snort host=localhost
Now that all the necessary software are installed and ready to run, it is time to configure 
Snort.  To  do  this,  the  Snort  configuration  file  /usr/local/snort/etc/snort.conf  have  to  be 
modified. The next points show how to do it:
• sudo cp /usr/local/snort/etc/snort.conf /usr/local/snort/etc/snort.conf.orig
• Change the following lines:
◦ dynamicpreprocessor directory /usr/local/lib/snort_dynamicpreprocessor/
◦ dynamicengine /usr/local/lib/snort_dynamicengine/libsf_engine.so
◦ dynamicdetection directory /usr/local/lib/snort_dynamicrules
◦ preprocessor  http_inspect:  global  iis_unicode_map  unicode.map  1252 
compress_depth 20480 decompress_depth 20480
By these:
◦ dynamicpreprocessor directory /usr/local/snort/lib/snort_dynamicpreprocessor/
◦ dynamicengine /usr/local/snort/lib/snort_dynamicengine/libsf_engine.so
◦ dynamicdetection directory /usr/local/snort/lib/snort_dynamicrules
◦ preprocessor http_inspect: global iis_unicode_map unicode.map 1252
• Delete the line:
◦ inspect_gzip \
• Modify the line(outpot for barnyard2):
◦ #output log_unified2: filename snort.log, limit 128, nostamp
Add this:




• In  order  to  detect  a  port-scan  against  some  machine,  the  following  has  to  be 
modified[71]:
◦ # preprocessor sfportscan: proto  { all } memcap { 10000000 } sense_level { low }
By this:
◦ preprocessor sfportscan: proto  { all } scan_type { all } memcap { 10000000 } 
sense_level { high } logfile { portscan.log }
In this point, Snort has been installed and configured, now the next step is test if it run 
properly. To do this, the next command has to be executed:
sudo /usr/local/snort/bin/snort -u snort -g snort -c /usr/local/snort/etc/snort.conf -i eth0
• -u <user>: Change the user/UID Snort runs under to user after initialization.
• -g <group>: Change the group/GID Snort runs under to group after initialization. This 
switch allows Snort to drop root privileges after it initialization phase has completed 
as a security measure.
• -c <config-file>: Use the rules located in file config-file
• -i <interface>: Sniff packets on interface
In this case the network interface is eth0, in other case it could be different. If all has gone 
correctly, a message saying “Initialization Complete” has to appear (Figure 12).
The last step to have Snort working properly, is start Barnyard2. The next command show 
how to do it:






-D (not use to check the output and see if it is working properly)
• -c <file>: Use configuration file <file>
• -G <file>: Read the gen-msg map from <file>
• -S <file>: Read the sid-msg map from <file>
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• -d <dir>:  Spool files from <dir>
• -f <base>: Use <base> as the base filename pattern
• -w <file>: Enable bookmarking using <file>
• -D: Run barnyard2 in background (daemon) mode
To check if Barnyard2 is running properly, one way is to do a ping to the machine and an 
output similar to Figure 13 most appear.
To start automatically Snort and Barnyard2 in the start-up of the system, both commands 
has to be copied at the end of the file /etc/rc.local, just befor the “exit 0” line.
 6.3.2 Report analyzers
Once has been checked that Snort and Barnyard2 start properly, it is time to do some test  
and analyze the reports of Snort. In order to understand easier the reports of Snort have been 
implemented some application.
In this tests, the version 1.4.5 of BASE[54] has been used to analyze the results of Snort. 
BASE provides a web front-end to query and analyze the alerts coming from a Snort IDS 
system. With BASE is possible to perform analysis of intrusions that Snort has detected on the 
network.  Without  this  kind  of  applications,  the  analysis  of  the  results  should  be  done 
analyzing log files like Figure 14. This task would be harder and more attacks could be lost 
between such quantity of data.
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BASE needs  to  work  ADOdb(Active  Data  Objects  Data  Base).  ADOdb is  a  database 
abstraction library for PHP. After download both packages, the following has to be done to 
install them:
• sudo mv adodb /var/www
• sudo mv base /var/www
• sudo cd /var/www/base
• sudo cp base_conf.php.dist base_conf.php
• Edif base_conf.php checking that the following parameters:
◦ $BASE_urlpath = "/base";
◦ $DBlib_path = "/var/www/adodb/";
◦ $DBtype = "mysql";
◦ $alert_dbname = "snort";
◦ $alert_host = "localhost";
◦ $alert_port = "";
◦ $alert_user = "snort";
◦ $alert_password = "password_from_user_snort";
To configure BASE, in the URL of a web browser, type: IP_of_Snort_machine/base, in 
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this case 10.0.0.5/base. A web page like Figure 15 will appear. “Setup page” has to be clicked 
to configure and optimize the DB.
Then a page like Figure 16 will appear. In this page the button “Create BASE AG” has to 
be  pushed  adding  the  needed  tables  in  the  Snort  DB  which  will  support  the  BASE 
functionality.
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Figure 17: BASE: Database created
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After push in the button, a page like Figure 17 will appear, showing if the creation of the 
tables in the DB has finished successfully. After click in “Main page”, the BASE page will 
appear. Must have an aspect like Figure 18.
Optionally the next packages can be installed to be able to generate graphs with BASE:
• sudo apt-get install php-pear
• sudo pear install Image_Color
• sudo pear install Image_Canvas-alpha
• sudo pear install Image_Graph-alpha
• sudo /etc/init.d/apache2 stop
• sudo /etc/init.d/apache2 start
This Installation Guide (points 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 ) has been done based on the indications of 
the references.[62][63][64][65][66][71]
 6.4 Nessus
Nessus, mentioned in a previous section, is a powerful, up-to-date and easy to use network 
security scanner. Actually, it is one of the top products of its type, by this reason has been 
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selected to explain it installation and how it works. With Nessus is possible to remotely audit 
a given network and determine if it has been broken into or misused in some way. Nessus also 
provides  the  ability  to  locally  audit  a  specific  machine  for  vulnerabilities,  compliance 
specifications, content policy violations and more. Detecting when the system is in rick to 
suffer an attack. Some of it characteristics are[67]:
• Intelligent Scanning: Nessus do not assume that a given service is running on a fixed 
port. For example, if a web server is running in the port 2222, Nessus will detect it and 
tests it security appropriately.
• Modular Architecture: The Client/Server architecture provides the flexibility to deploy 
the scanner in a machine(server), and connect to the GUI(client) from any machine 
with a web-browser.
• Plugin Architecture: Each security test is written as an external plugin grouped into 
one of the 42 families. In this way, it is easy to select an specific plugin or a family of 
plugins. A complete list of its plugins can be found at it homepage[69].
• NASL  (Nessus  Attack  Scripting  Language):  Nessus  Scanner  includes  NASL,  a 
language designed to write security test easily and quickly.
• Update Security Vulnerabilities Database: The Nessus database is updated daily with 
the newly disclosed vulnerabilities.
• Test  Multiple  Host  Simultaneously:  It  is  possible  to  test  a  large  number  of  host 
concurrently. 
• Complete  Reports:  Furthermore  to  generate  a  report  with  security  vulnerabilities 
existent in the network and the risk level of each (Low, Medium, High, and Critical), 
Nessus gives some measures to mitigate these vulnerabilities.
 6.4.1 Installation and Configuration
Nessus  has been installed in  the  Linux Server.  Assuming that  Ubuntu 10.04 server  is 
already installed and after download the last version of the program from it homepage[49]. 
Figure 19 shows the message shows when the installation has been finished successfully after 
run the next command:




The first step to configure Nessus after it installation is to create an user to log into Nessus 
to initiate scans and retrieve results. The next command show how to do it:
• sudo /opt/nessus/sbin/nessus-adduser
◦ Set the username: nessus_u ser (in this case)
◦ Set the password (tus2010NessuS)
◦ Be this user Nessus admin
◦ Leave the rules in Blank
◦ Confirm the data
In Figure 20 all this steps are show.
Once the user to administrate Nessus has been created, the next step is to register Nessus 
to be able to communicate with the SecurityCenter. A home activation code can be request in 
the homepage of Nessus[49]. With the next command the Activation code is registered in the 
system and the newest plugins will be installed:
• sudo /opt/nessus/bin/nessus-fetch - -register <Activation code>
To finish with the initial installation and configuration of Nessus, it has to be started. To 
do this, the next command has to be typed:
• sudo /opt/nessus/sbin/nessus-service -D
Depending of the OS where Nessus has been installed, an output similar to Figure 21 must 
appear.
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At this point, Nessus has been installed, updated and started. Now, to access to it web 
interface,  it  is enough with type in the URL of a web-browser the IP_of_the_server:8834 
(8834 is the default port). After accept the security certificate of nessus, a login page will 
appear (Figure 22). After log into the system, the main page will appear (Figure 23). In this 
page there are 4 buttons from which the scans are configured. 
• The button “Users” redirect to a page where it is possible to Add, Delete or Edit the 
users that will be able to log into the system and its characteristic.
• The button “Policies” redirect the user to the most important page of the system. This 
page is the heart of Nessus Scanner, is where the policies that will be associated to a 
scan are Created and configured. A Nessus “Policy” consist of configuration options 
related to performing a vulnerability scan. Some of these options are:
◦ Parameters that control technical aspects of the scan such as timeouts, number of 
hosts, type of port scanner and more.
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◦ Credentials for local scans (Windows, SSH, etc.), authenticated Oracle Database 
scans, HTTP, FTP, POP, IMAP or Kerberos based authentication.
◦ Granular family or plugin based scan specifications.
◦ Database  compliance  policy  checks,  report  verbosity,  service  detection  scan 
settings,Unix compliance checks and more.
• The button “Scan” redirect to the page where the scan are programmed and associated 
with a police.
• The button “Report” redirect to a page where all the scans performed are showed. 
Clicking in one of this links, the user is redirect to the correspondent scan and the 
results are showed.
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This  Installation  Guide  (point 6.4.1  )  has  been  done  based  on the  indications  of  the 
reference.[67][68]
 6.5 Tests
First  of  all  say  that  all  the  attacks  have  been  performed  in  a  virtual  and  controlled 
environment and in any moment have been tried against a real machine. These attacks have 
been done for a educational purpose, see how Snort reacts against them.
All the attacks has been performed from the “Linux Client2”. Most of them using the 
metasploit framework[70], integrate in the Backtrack distribution.
 6.5.1 Port scan
Nessus has been used to perform a port scan (typically the first step to carried out an 
attack) to check if Snort is able to detect this kind of attacks. To do this, first of all has been  
created a “Policy” in Nessus which has been configured to do a full scan. Once the “Policy” 
has been created, an “Scan” has been configured using this policy and setting the windows 
client (10.0.0.15) as the target of the scan.
Figure  24 shows the file “portscan.log” created by Snort. Each field has the following 
meaning: 
• Time: make reference to the moment when the scan has been done
• Event_id: used to link an alert with the corresponding Open Port tagged packet.
• 10.0.0.5 → 10.0.0.15: shows the source and the target of the scan.
• Priority Count:  keeps track of bad responses (resets,  unreachables). The higher the 
priority count, the more bad responses have been received.
• Connection count: lists how many connections are active on the hosts (src or dst). This 
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is  accurate  for  connection-based protocols,  and is  more  of  an  estimate  for  others. 
Whether or not a portscan was filtered is determined here. High connection count and 
low priority count would indicate filtered (no response received from target).
• IP count: keeps track of the last IP to contact a host, and increments the count if the 
next IP is different. For one-to-one scans, this is a low number. For active hosts this 
number will be high regardless, and one-to-one scans may appear as a distributed scan.
• Scanner IP Range: changes depending on the type of alert. Port sweep (one-to-many) 
scans display the scanned IP range. Portscans (one-to-one) display the scanner IP.
• Port/Proto Count: keeps track of the last port contacted and increments this number 
when  that  changes.  This  count  is  used  (along  with  IP  Count)  to  determine  the 
difference between one-to-one portscans and one-to-one decoys.
Figure  25 shows the log generated by Barnyard2 which is  send to  the database.  And 
Figure 26 shows how BASE, after analyze the information of the Database, generate a report 
with all the portscan performed in the network analyzed by the IDS. All the porstcan are links 
to a report where more information is showed.
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 6.5.2 Windows Client
Different attacks have been done in the Windows Client. The realization of some of this 
attacks  would  require  a  previous  Social  Engineering  Attack  with  the  purpose  to  get  that 
someone in his computer execute the malicious code generated.
All the vulnerabilities are not zero day, so the most of the anti-virus must detect an attack 
which purpose is to exploit some of these vulnerabilities, by this reason, it is necessary to 
disable  the  anti-virus  to  carried  out  this  tests  but,  in  some moment  (not  much  far),  this 
vulnerabilities could be exploited without need to disable it, because, like declare a recent 
study about  anti-virus[72],  “Even  after  30  days,  many  AV vendors  cannot  detect  known  
attacks”, one reason more to install extra security measures in the companies. Furthermore, 
there are a huge quantity of common users who have not the anti-virus updated, or with the 
license expired, doing the system vulnerable to these attacks.
 6.5.2.1 Test 1: Reverse shell embed in a PDF file
In  this  test  a  vulnerability  has  been  exploited  in  the  PDF  readers  which  allow  the 
execution of code embed in a PDF file when it is open. To do this, first of all is necessary the 
creation of a .exe with reverse shell to embed in the PDF file (the creation of this PDF is 
explained in the Appendix II). This PDF will be send to the victim (this part is assumed that  
has been done by means of some Engineering Social Attack). When the victim open this PDF, 
the victim machine try to connect with the machine set in the PDF, which is listening, giving a 
session to the attacker machine (Figure 23) for where the “hacker” has full control of the the 
victim machine(Figure 28).
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As is showed in Figure 29, when this attack is performed, Snort only is able to detect that 
there  a  connection  between  two  machines  (the  attacker  and  the  victim).  Although  the 
information is very simple, in some scenarios it could be enough to detect this attack. For 
example,  in  a  organization  where  the  connections  between an  internal  system with  other 
system is really limited to some ports, to some specific IP, it is forbidden the fact to detect this  
log would generate an alert and the correspondent measure would be done. The problem is 
that typically the connection between the internal systems and the external is not so limited, 
and this information could be confused, for example, with a connection with some web server.
Figure 30 shows the detection of the same attack in Base. Like it is possible to see in this 
example, Base show the information quite organized and even show the payload of the traffic 
detected.
 6.5.2.2 Test 2: EasyFTP
This second test is based in a vulnerability in the software EasyFTP. This vulnerability 
provoke a Buffer Overflow which can be used to execute arbitrary code.  In this case,  an 
exploit  that provoke a Denial-of-Service (DoS) has been launched against the server.  The 
version of the EasyFTP used is 1.7.0.11 and the exploit easyftp_cwd_fixret.
As result of launch this exploit against the ftp service is that this is stopped. To perform 
this attack, first of all it is necessary to have an account in the ftp server, to do this test, the 
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Figure 30: Detection of the reverse shell in Base
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user “thesis” with the password “thesis” has been created.
With EasyFTP running (Figure 31) and once the attack is launched (see Appendix III for 
more details), the next Figures show how Snort is able to detect this attacks showing a FTP 
CWD(change working directory) overflow message. Figure 32 shows how Barnyard2 log this 
attack and Figure 33 shows how BASE report this attack.
Figure  34 shows how the EasyFtp Server is stopped as a result of the exploit launched. 
This problem is solved in the new version, renamed to UplusFtp.
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Figure 31: EasyFTP running
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 6.5.2.3 Test 3: LNK Shortcut File code execution
As is said in the Microsoft Security Bulltin MS10-46[73], the vulnerability used to do this 
test “could allow remote code execution if the icon of a specially crafted shortcut is displayed. 
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as 
the  local  user”.  Actually  Microsoft  has  published  a  security  update  which  correct  this 
vulnerability. By this reason, to do this test this security update has to be removed of the 
victim machine. This update is KB2286198.
Like happened with the test 1, actually this vulnerability is solved, but until some days 
ago, Microsoft has not been published an update for this vulnerability, so all the systems have 
been exposed to this vulnerability during quite time since it has been published. System that 
do not have all the Microsoft updated installed, could be affected by this problem yet.
The result  of Snort  when this attacks has been performed (see Appendix IV for more 
information) is not satisfactory because it has passed unnoticed for Snort. This is because has 
not been a direct attack against the virtual machine, only has been a visit to an specific URL 
by part of the victim, which has exploited a vulnerability in windows which has allow the 
establishment of a session between the victim and the attacker machine giving to the attacker 
the same privileges that this user has in the system attacked.
This  is  an  example  of  why  is  so  important  the  user  education  in  order  to  prevent 
successful social engineering attacks. Although for this concrete vulnerability, a proper user 
education did not prevented it  exploitation,  because it  could be spread by means of flash 
memories,  only  connecting  them  to  a  computer.  Fortunately,  how  has  been  said  at  the 
beginning of this point, there are already a solution for this dangerous vulnerability.
A similar test with the same results has been done. In this case, the vulnerability exploited 
was in the Windows Help and Support Center and could allow remote code execution if a user 
views a specially crafted web page using a web browser or clicks a specially crafted link in an 
e-mail  message.[74]  Actually  there  are  a  windows  update  that  resolve  this  vulnerability, 
concretely the update KB2229593.
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 6.5.3 Test conclusions
After the realization of these tests, has been showed that when an attack which create a 
reverse shell is carried out, Snort is not able to directly detect these kind of attacks (test1 and 
test3). The conclusion that can be extracted is that an IDS is an efficient security measure but, 
like the others, it is not perfect. It is a good tool to increase the security of a computer network 





Due to resource limitations of the host-base, where all the scenario has been deployed, 
have been problems to deploy some test. Tests that use attacks that require high broadband 








 8 Future work
An interesting future work could be the installation of a Signature-Based NIDS and an 
Anomaly-Based NIDS in a real infrastructure, for example in the laboratory of some subject. 
The purpose of this, would be study more in-depth the Signature-Based NIDS, and how the 
Anomaly-Based NIDS learns with the daily behavior of the students. Furthermore, in this real 
scenario,  could  be  possible  the  installation  of  the  NIDS  using  a  switched  port  analyzer 
(SPAN) studding how to configure this characteristic of the switch.
Furthermore, to study and install an IPS would be another interesting future work. This 
kind of intrusion detection system is  really interesting because with it  is  possible  to  take 
measures against an attack faster than with the passive IDS, which generate an alert to be 









In a short period of time, the use and services offered in Internet have increased quickly. 
Nowadays,  the  use  of  Internet  and  services  offered  in  it  is  present  in  the  most  of  the 
quotidians activities with the computers. This has made necessary the quick adaptation and 
proliferation of security measures to protect all the activities carried out through Internet.
As showed in this thesis, tools like IDS and honeypots, not intended to replace firewalls or 
anti-virus, are each time more and more present in the computer security. Detection and study 
of attacks are one pillar more within the network security to help an administrator to prevent, 
detect and act against malicious activities against the machines.
IDS have many lines of work and a whole range of users can be beneficed by this tools,  
from consumers who install some IDS like Snort to defend its small network, until companies 
that spend huge quantity of money to buy IDS developed by already consolidated companies. 
But the use of this security tools, must always be supervised by a security expert with the 
necessary knowledge to analyze and interpret the reports of this tool and apply measures to 
correct the problems detected in the systems.
Honeypots can be very effective to find and study new malware that traditional antivirus 
can not detect until a signature of this malware is generated. But this application is not able to 
react against the malware and attacks that detect, by this is only one security measure more in 
the set of security measures needed to protect a system.
Although IDSs are a good option to know what is taking place in the network in terms of 
attacks, and honeypots can be very effective to find new malware and to focus the attacks in it 
giving  time  to  the  network  administrators  to  take  in  place  measures  against  these  new 
malware,  another  important  pillar  within the network security and that it  must be always 
present is the user education. This is not an easy task, and in spite of the effort to make the  
users aware about the importance of have a good practices in the quotidian activities is really 
difficult that all the users acquire this education. A good example is the password problem, for 
decades  has  been  said  that  choose  a  good  password  is  important,  although  several  easy 
suggestions to make a password more complex and harder to guess are given, the common 
users  continue  using  weak  password  because  these  users  do  not  fully  understand  how a 
computer works and for them is easier remember a weak password than a secure passwords. 
Correct this is really difficult, for example, if has been decided to set to each user a hard 
password, it is really common to see postfix on the computer screen or on the table with this 
password.
The final conclusion is that the world of computer security is not easy, and that there is not 
a  final  security  method  to  do  a  system  impenetrable.  By  this,  a  collection  of  security 
measures, like the explained throughout this thesis (IDS, honeypots, penetration test), must be 
installed in all the organizations in order to get a system the most secure possible in order to 
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Appendix I – Netcraft
Netcraft (http://news.netcraft.com/) results on www.kth.se
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Figure 35: Netcraft Results 1
Figure 36: Netcraft Results 2
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Appendix II – Creation of a PDF with a reverse shell embed
First of all the exe file to embed in the PDF file has to be created. To create this exe the tool  
msfpayload (from metasploit framework) has been used. The following Figures show how to 
create and embed the exe in a PDF file.
Figure  37 show how to create an exe file with a reverse shell. In the command is indicated 
that the exe have to contain the payload “windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp”, the address of 
the host (LHOST) that is listen in the port (LPORT) waiting that someone connect with it. The 
LHOST is the IP of the attacker machine, 10.0.0.2 in this scenario.
Once the exe has been created, the next step is embed it in a PDF file. This have been done  
using the msfconsole (from metasploit framework). All the process is showed in the following 
Figures.
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Figure 37: msfpayload: creation of the exe file with a reverse shell
Figure 38: Running msfconsole
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Once the msfconsole is running (Figure  38), the next step is search the exploit to be used 
(Figure  39).  In this  case a vulnerability in  Adobe Reader  is  going to be exploited so the 
exploit selected is “windows/fileformat/adobe_pdf_embedded_exe”. Figure 40 shows how to 
use this exploit, set the payload (reverse_tcp), and the options. Once of the options has been 
configured (Figure  41), the last step is to run the exploit to generate the PDF with the exe 
embed.
Figure 42 shows how to leave the attacker machine listening to get the session in the victim 
machine.
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Figure 40: Adobe Embedded exe: Selecting exploit and payload




Figure 42: Adobe Embedded exe: Start to listen the atacker machine
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Appendix III – Attack against EasyFtp
The first  step is to select the correspondent exploit:  easyftp_cwd_fixret.  This module was 
created by Paul Makowski and Jduck and exploits a stack-based buffer overflow in EasyFTP 
Server 1.7.0.11 and earlier. EasyFTP fails to check input size when parsing 'CWD' commands, 
which leads to a stack based buffer overflow. Once the exploit is selected, the payload has to 
be selected too. Typing “show options” are showed the options of the exploit and the payload. 
Figure 43 show this process.
Figure 44 shows how to set the required options and the result of launch the exploit.
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Figure 44: EasyFTP: Setting parameters and run exploit
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Appendix IV – LNK attack
Once has been searched and selected the correspondent exploit, it is set the payload (Figure 
45). The next step is to configure the required options showed in Figure 46, and launch the 
exploit (Figure 47). When the exploit is launched, is showed the direction where the victim 
has to access to execute the code embed in the LNK shortcut. Is supposed that this link is 
spread by social engineering.
When the victim access to the link with the LNK shortcut, a session is opened (Figure 48). 
When this session is selected, the attacker get a session against the victim machine with the 
privileges of the user that has access to the link(Figure 49).
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Figure 45: LNK attack: Search and selection of exploit and payload




Figure 47: LNK attack: Setting options and launching exploit




Figure 49: LNK attack: Openning session with the victim
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ABS Anomaly Based System
API Application Programming Interface
BASE Basic Analysis and Security Engine
CHECK IT Security Health Check Service
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability
CWD Change Working Directory
DB Database
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DMZ Demilitarized Zone
DNS Domain Name System
DoS Denial of Service
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
FTP File Transport Protocol
HIDS Host-based Intrusion Detection System
HIHAT High Interaction Honeypot Analysis Toolkit
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IGMP Internet Group Management Protocol
IMAP Internet Message Access Protocol
IP Internet Protocol
IPS Intrusion Prevention System
IRC Internet Relay Chat
ISACA Standards for Information Systems Auditing
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MBR Master Boot Record
NASL Nessus Attack Scripting Language
NFS Network File System
NIDS Network-based Intrusion Detection System
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NMAP Network Mapper





OSSTMM Open Source Security Methodology Manual
OWASP Open Web Application Security Project
PCRE Perl Compatible Regular Expressions
POP Post Office Protocol
RATs Remote Access Trojans
SARA Security Auditor's Research Assistant
SATAN Security Administrator's Tool for Analyzing Networks
SBS Signature Based System
SMB Server Message Block
SPAN Switch Port Analyzer
SQL Structured Query Language
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TOS Type Of Service
UDP User Datagram Protocol
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